Vulnerabilidades
Resumen — últimos 7 días
Vulnerabilidades nuevas2768▼ 449 respecto a la semana anterior
Críticas / altas1325▼ 128 respecto a la semana anterior
Nueva explotación activa (KEV)4▼ 5 respecto a la semana anterior
Sin puntuar (sin CVSS)268▼ 240 respecto a la semana anterior
164 resultados, ordenados por fecha de publicación (más recientes primero)
| CVE | Estado | Severidad | EPSS | Explotación activa | Tecnologías afectadas | Publicada ▼ | Modificada | Descripción |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Analizada | Alta (7.1) | 0.40% | — | Praisonaiagents | 10/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, web_crawl's httpx fallback path passes user-supplied URLs directly to httpx.AsyncClient.get() with follow_redirects=True and no host validation. An LLM agent tricked into crawling an internal URL can reach cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254),… | |
| Analizada | Media (5.5) | 0.18% | — | Praisonai | 10/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.8) | 0.22% | — | Praisonai | 10/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI's AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.4) | 0.53% | — | Praisonai | 10/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, cmd_unpack in the recipe CLI extracts .praison tar archives using raw tar.extract() without validating archive member paths. A .praison bundle containing ../../ entries will write files outside the intended output directory. An attacker who distributes a… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.8) | 0.23% | — | Praisonai | 10/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI automatically loads a file named tools.py from the current working directory to discover and register custom agent tools. This loading process uses importlib.util.spec_from_file_location and immediately executes module-level code via… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.6) | 0.46% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI treats remotely fetched template files as trusted executable code without integrity verification, origin validation, or user confirmation, enabling supply chain attacks through malicious templates. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. | |
| Analizada | Media (6.5) | 0.39% | — | Praisonaiagents | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, the execute_command function in shell_tools.py calls os.path.expandvars() on every command argument at line 64, manually re-implementing shell-level environment variable expansion despite using shell=False (line 88) for security. This allows exfiltration… | |
| Analizada | Media (5.3) | 0.40% | — | Praisonaiagents | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he list_files() tool in FileTools validates the directory parameter against workspace boundaries via _validate_path(), but passes the pattern parameter directly to Path.glob() without any validation. Since Python's Path.glob() supports .. path segments,… | |
| Analizada | Media (5.3) | 0.84% | 💥 Exploit | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the AgentOS deployment platform exposes a GET /api/agents endpoint that returns agent names, roles, and the first 100 characters of agent system instructions to any unauthenticated caller. The AgentOS FastAPI application has no authentication middleware, no… | |
| Analizada | Media (6.5) | 0.38% | — | Praisonaiagents | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, the web_crawl() function in praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py accepts arbitrary URLs from AI agents with zero validation. No scheme allowlisting, hostname/IP blocklisting, or private network checks are applied before fetching. This allows an… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.3) | 0.16% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the gateway's /api/approval/allow-list endpoint permits unauthenticated modification of the tool approval allowlist when no auth_token is configured (the default). By adding dangerous tool names (e.g., shell_exec, file_write) to the allowlist, an attacker can… | |
| Analizada | Media (6.5) | 0.38% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the _safe_extractall() function in PraisonAI's recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling tar.extractall(). An attacker… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.5) | 0.33% | — | Praisonaiagents | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, read_skill_file() in skill_tools.py allows reading arbitrary files from the filesystem by accepting an unrestricted skill_path parameter. Unlike file_tools.read_file which enforces workspace boundary confinement, and unlike run_skill_script which… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.5) | 0.57% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the /media-stream WebSocket endpoint in PraisonAI's call module accepts connections from any client without authentication or Twilio signature validation. Each connection opens an authenticated session to OpenAI's Realtime API using the server's API key. There… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.5) | 0.41% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (10) | 0.34% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the /api/v1/runs endpoint accepts an arbitrary webhook_url in the request body with no URL validation. When a submitted job completes (success or failure), the server makes an HTTP POST request to this URL using httpx.AsyncClient. An unauthenticated attacker… | |
| Analizada | Alta (8.1) | 0.33% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, deploy.py constructs a single comma-delimited string for the gcloud run deploy --set-env-vars argument by directly interpolating openai_model, openai_key, and openai_base without validating that these values do not contain commas. gcloud uses a comma as the… | |
| Analizada | Media (6.1) | 0.26% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the Flask API endpoint in src/praisonai/api.py renders agent output as HTML without effective sanitization. The _sanitize_html function relies on the nh3 library, which is not listed as a required or optional dependency in pyproject.toml. When nh3 is absent… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.3) | 0.34% | — | Praisonaiagents | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.6) | 0.60% | — | Praisonai | 9/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.121, the execute_command function and workflow shell execution are exposed to user-controlled input via agent workflows, YAML definitions, and LLM-generated tool calls, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary shell commands through shell metacharacters. This… | |
| Analizada | Alta (8.8) | 0.56% | — | Praisonai | 8/4/2026 | 24/7/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the create_agent_centric_tools() function returns tools (like acp_create_file) that process file content using template rendering. When user input from agent.start() is passed directly into these tools without escaping, template expressions in the input are… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.8) | 0.81% | — | Praisonai | 8/4/2026 | 24/7/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses the js-yaml library to parse YAML files without disabling dangerous tags (such as !!js/function and !!js/undefined). This allows an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that, when parsed, executes arbitrary… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.5) | 0.48% | — | Praisonai | 8/4/2026 | 24/7/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the A2U (Agent-to-User) event stream server in PraisonAI exposes all agent activity without authentication. The create_a2u_routes() function registers the following endpoints with NO authentication checks: /a2u/info, /a2u/subscribe, /a2u/events/{stream_name},… | |
| Analizada | Crítica (9.9) | 0.61% | — | Praisonai | 8/4/2026 | 24/7/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper… | |
| Analizada | Alta (7.1) | 0.46% | — | Praisonai | 7/4/2026 | 17/6/2026 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal manifest.json before it verifies that the manifest name and version match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place ../… |