CVE-2026-99296
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len
handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is.
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An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it.
req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(), ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:
Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(), handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply(). A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side use of front_alloc_len in this file.
Technical details traces, logs and code from the original report
rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105) Call Trace: ... kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Timeline
Built from our own data: NVD, CISA KEV and other exploitation catalogues, FIRST EPSS, public exploits, specialised media and Orbitaley coverage.
- CVE record published in NVD
Affected technologies (1)
⚠ AI-inferred from the description — NVD hasn't analyzed this CVE yet, these aren't verified CPEs.
NVD record
- NVD status
- Received
- Published
- Nov 16, 2026
- Last modified
- Nov 16, 2026
- CVSS
- NVD hasn't assigned a CVSS score to this CVE (common since the April 2026 policy change).
References
Raw JSON (NVD)
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{
"id": "CVE-2026-99296",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6305a3b415157759bfe4b50a643fac22ea229f5c",
"lessThan": "c6696ac94c8c3ad79a9fa57fc334af2dc1a1f72e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6305a3b415157759bfe4b50a643fac22ea229f5c",
"lessThan": "04a04953b4828bfd8efd4ea3e7e9ad7dac5b083b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6305a3b415157759bfe4b50a643fac22ea229f5c",
"lessThan": "be9fa57665efae4060d17ab21675c1c033d54a80",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6305a3b415157759bfe4b50a643fac22ea229f5c",
"lessThan": "62b41a16d8603d4d809fda212f15c3e9c783a82b",
"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"net/ceph/mon_client.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.9"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "4.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.61",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"net/ceph/mon_client.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-11-16T10:17:02.660",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04a04953b4828bfd8efd4ea3e7e9ad7dac5b083b",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62b41a16d8603d4d809fda212f15c3e9c783a82b",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be9fa57665efae4060d17ab21675c1c033d54a80",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6696ac94c8c3ad79a9fa57fc334af2dc1a1f72e",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len\n\nhandle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size\nof the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the\nmonitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to\nget_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever\ngeneric request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size\nhowever short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct\nceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes\nceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never\nreceived: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or\nbytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and\nis then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not\nflag it.\n\nreq->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),\nceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back\nfrom write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes\nit to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:\n\n rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)\n Call Trace:\n ...\n kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)\n vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)\n ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nUse msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),\nhandle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().\nA well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one\ntakes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e (\"libceph:\nbound get_version reply decode to front len\") to the last decode-side\nuse of front_alloc_len in this file."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-11-16T10:17:02.660",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}