CVE-2026-98980
Noticias y reportajes en Orbitaley
En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad:
namei: no revelar entradas sobremontadas en refwalk
En rcuwalk, el dentry se valida antes de aceptarlo. step_into() step_into() vuelve a comprobar d_seq y __follow_mount_rcu() vuelve a comprobar mount_lock. Una entrada que se desvincula entre medias hace que la búsqueda se reintente y no la encuentre.
Un refwalk no hace esto. lookup_fast() toma una referencia sobre el dentry hasheado y simplemente lo acepta. Así, una desvinculación que ocurre después de tomar la referencia no la ve refwalk. Eso está bien para un archivo sencillo. Simplemente tuvimos la suerte de abrirlo antes de que se desvinculara; no hay problema.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
Para un punto de montaje, y concretamente un punto de montaje bloqueado, no lo está en absoluto. La desvinculación separa todos los montajes y luego elimina el nombre. Cualquier refwalk que aún no haya recorrido los montajes simplemente revela la entrada subyacente. La ventana es muy estrecha, pero puede aprovecharse:
Consulte el parche adjunto para un reproductor más fiable.
Por tanto, comprobar la entrada después de step_into(). unlink(), rmdir() y rename() marcan el dentry con dont_mount() antes de separar los montajes y eliminar el dentry.
Así, un dentry marcado con DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT y que ya no está hasheado en el momento en que se consultaron sus montajes es un nombre que fue desvinculado durante el refwalk. DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT se lee después de consultar los montajes y se establece antes de que sean separados por detach_mounts(). Un refwalk que no vio los montajes verá DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT.
d_unlinked() simple está bien. Un rename quita el dentry de su cadena hash, pero ___d_drop() deja d_hash.pprev establecido. Así, solo __d_drop() y un rename sobre el dentry lo deshashean. El único movimiento que cambia IS_ROOT inserta un alias desconectado. Ese no tiene DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT activado.
Añadir la a step_into_slowpath(). ".." y LOOKUP_DOWN pueden legítimamente aterrizar en un directorio no hasheado. Un refwalk que cruzó a un montaje tiene path.mnt distinto de nd->path.mnt. Una entrada que un sistema de archivos eliminó por su cuenta (d_invalidate(), d_drop()) no tiene el indicador activado y se trata como antes.
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
lecturas de un archivo cubierto en 60 s, 3 recorredores, ~15000 desvinculaciones
sin ensanchar la ventana 27
ese paso + 200 us 3741
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of
* its mount, against walkers that open it through that copy.
*
* A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file
* MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound
* on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is
* closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1,
* where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT.
* A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was
* gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED).
*
* usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers]
*/
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdatomic.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/openat2.h>
#ifndef __NR_open_tree
#define __NR_open_tree 428
#endif
#ifndef __NR_move_mount
#define __NR_move_mount 429
#endif
#ifndef __NR_openat2
#define __NR_openat2 437
#endif
#ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE
#define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1
#endif
#ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC
#define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC
#endif
#ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH
#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004
#endif
#define WORK "/tmp/uc"
#define ADIR WORK "/A"
static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3;
static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting;
static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER;
static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 while there is none */
static atomic_long n_unlink, n_walk, n_mark, n_enoent, n_othe
---truncated---Traducción automática del texto original de NVD (en inglés).
Cronología
Elaborada con nuestros propios datos: NVD, CISA KEV y otros catálogos de explotación, FIRST EPSS, exploits públicos, prensa especializada y la cobertura de Orbitaley.
- Registro CVE publicado en NVD
- Última modificación del registro en NVD
- Alerta: Corregidas nueve vulnerabilidades en el kernel de Linux, tres de ellas con puntuación crítica
Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation80 % - Impacto principal
T1005Data from Local Systemcollection70 %
Vector AV:L/PR:L/UI:N; race en namei que revela la entrada subyacente tras un montaje (lectura del fichero oculto, C:H), según la descripción del kernel Linux.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Registro NVD
- Estado en NVD
- Recibida
- Publicada
- 23 oct 2026
- Última modificación
- 24 oct 2026
- Vector CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-98980",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "CHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 6,
"exploitabilityScore": 2
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe",
"lessThan": "e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe",
"lessThan": "5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe",
"lessThan": "b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe",
"lessThan": "8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994",
"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/namei.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.18"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "3.18",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/namei.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:19.750",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnamei: don't reveal overmounted entries in refwalk\n\nIn rcuwalk the dentry is validated before it is accepted. step_into()\nstep_into() rechecks d_seq and __follow_mount_rcu() rechecks mount_lock.\nAn entry that gets unlinked in between causes the lookup to retry and\nmiss.\n\nA refwalk doesn't do this. lookup_fast() takes a reference on the hashed\ndentry and simply accepts it. So an unlink that happens after the\nreference was taken isn't seen by refwalk. That's fine for a simple\nfile. We just happened to open it before it was unlinked, no problem.\n\nFor a mountpoint and specifically a locked mountpoint it very much\nisn't. The unlink detaches all mounts and then removes the name. Any\nrefwalk that hasn't traversed the mounts yet simply reveals the\nunderlying entry. It's a very narrow window but it can be hit:\n\n reads of a covered file in 60 s, 3 walkers, ~15000 unlinks\n no widening 27\n that step + 200 us 3741\n\nSee the appended patch for a more reliable reproducer.\n\nSo check the entry after step_into(). unlink(), rmdir() and rename()\nmark the dentry with dont_mount() before they detach the mounts and\nremove the dentry.\n\nSo a dentry that is marked with DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT and is unhashed by the\ntime its mounts were looked at is a name that was unlinked under the\nrefwalk. DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT is read after the mounts were looked up and\nit is set before they are detached by detach_mounts(). A refwalk that\nmissed the mounts will see DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT.\n\nPlain d_unlinked() is fine. A rename takes the dentry off its hash chain\nbut ___d_drop() leaves d_hash.pprev set. So only __d_drop() and a rename\nover the dentry unhash it. The only move that flips IS_ROOT splices in a\ndisconnected alias. That doesn't have DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT set.\n\nAdd the to step_into_slowpath(). \"..\" and LOOKUP_DOWN may legitimately\nland on an unhashed directory. A refwalk that crossed onto a mount has\npath.mnt different from nd->path.mnt. A dentry that a filesystem dropped\non its own (d_invalidate(), d_drop()) doesn't have the flag set and is\ntreated as before.\n\n // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n /*\n * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of\n * its mount, against walkers that open it through that copy.\n *\n * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file\n * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound\n * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is\n * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1,\n * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT.\n * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was\n * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED).\n *\n * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers]\n */\n #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE\n #define _GNU_SOURCE\n #endif\n #include <errno.h>\n #include <fcntl.h>\n #include <pthread.h>\n #include <stdatomic.h>\n #include <stdio.h>\n #include <stdlib.h>\n #include <string.h>\n #include <unistd.h>\n #include <sys/mount.h>\n #include <sys/stat.h>\n #include <sys/syscall.h>\n #include <linux/openat2.h>\n\n #ifndef __NR_open_tree\n #define __NR_open_tree 428\n #endif\n #ifndef __NR_move_mount\n #define __NR_move_mount 429\n #endif\n #ifndef __NR_openat2\n #define __NR_openat2 437\n #endif\n #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE\n #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1\n #endif\n #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC\n #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC\n #endif\n #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH\n #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004\n #endif\n\n #define WORK \"/tmp/uc\"\n #define ADIR WORK \"/A\"\n\n static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3;\n static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting;\n static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER;\n static int cur_fd = -1;\t\t/* the root of A', -1 while there is none */\n static atomic_long n_unlink, n_walk, n_mark, n_enoent, n_othe\n---truncated---"
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:50.510",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}