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CVE-2026-98070

Estado: En análisisAlta (8.1)—

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()

rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset().

Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns.

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Its state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent.

Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.

Two details of the old code go away with the same change:

The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them.

Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
 - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired.  The old code
   cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()
   releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before
   the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes.  Reading
   it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the
   teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until
   then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths
   remain as exposed to each other as they are today.

 - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no
   serialization at all.  It now runs under the lock like the normal
   path.  The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the
   previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path
   found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect
   worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes
   RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down
   meanwhile and is dropped.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Inferido por reglas deterministas a partir del vector CVSS y la CWE. Solo orientativo.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-98070",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
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        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2
      }
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              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.222",
              "versionType": "semver",
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            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.189",
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              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*"
            },
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              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.158",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.111",
              "versionType": "semver",
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            },
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              "versionType": "semver",
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            },
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              "version": "7.2.7",
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            },
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              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
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          "defaultStatus": "affected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.193",
  "references": [
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      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02c5f9dc2efd823e061954d564ce00bacd1bebeb",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
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      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()\n\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the\npath state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to\nbe sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling\nrds_send_path_reset().\n\nSampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()\ncan re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns.  Its\nstate recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the\nresetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the\nbit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire\noperation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss\neach other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with\nrds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly\nwhat the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to\nprevent.\n\nTake the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and\nrds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end.  The\nlock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the\nlock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()\ncan never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.\n\nTwo details of the old code go away with the same change:\n\n - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired.  The old code\n   cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()\n   releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before\n   the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes.  Reading\n   it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the\n   teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until\n   then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths\n   remain as exposed to each other as they are today.\n\n - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no\n   serialization at all.  It now runs under the lock like the normal\n   path.  The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the\n   previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path\n   found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect\n   worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes\n   RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down\n   meanwhile and is dropped.\n\nThe in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is\nrewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment\nabove the function (which still described a return value and an\nincomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four\nwriters - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what\nserializes each of them."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-10-03T11:18:28.063",
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}