CVE-2026-98069
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()
rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown.
The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it.
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Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.
Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().
The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.
Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 8.1
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.57%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 45
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access60 %
Inferido por reglas deterministas a partir del vector CVSS y la CWE. Solo orientativo.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-98069",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72",
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{
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],
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c",
"net/rds/ib_recv.c",
"net/rds/send.c",
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
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"version": "2.6.37"
},
{
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"version": "0",
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{
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{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver",
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},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*"
},
{
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"version": "7.3-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c",
"net/rds/ib_recv.c",
"net/rds/send.c",
"net/rds/tcp.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:36.043",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()\n\nrds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by\nwaiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and\nthen runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling\nthe bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the\nwait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or\nrds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run\nconcurrently with the teardown.\n\nThe sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,\nbut that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes\nthe state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads\nthe state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on\nweakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,\nand the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings\n(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the\ntransmit state under it.\n\nOracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of\nBUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL\ndereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -\nby making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead\nof testing them (\"rds: Make sure transmit path and connection\ntear-down does not run concurrently\"). Ownership of a single word is\ndecided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.\n\nDo the same here: take both locks before calling the transport\nshutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them\nexplicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with\nclear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the\ntransport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by\nrds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by\nthe next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().\n\nThe fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and\nrds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown\nowns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it\nacquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now\nspans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter\nruns from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue\nand holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so\na duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks\naccept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded\nby the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB\npath's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no\nblocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking\nacquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the\nfastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB\ndrain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The\nwindow is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the\nteardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.\n\nBecause krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued\nthere - accept processing for other connections and network\nnamespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()\nduring namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for\nthat time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each\nother: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and\nthe holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes\nwithout needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on\nthe path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by\nthe blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel\nwithout flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now\nnoted next to those cancels (on \n---truncated---"
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-10-03T11:18:27.807",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}