CVE-2026-91039
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.
The strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as "<name>/<connection_id>", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil.
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OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
CVSS
- Versión: 4.0
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Puntuación base: 9.1
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.66%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 50
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access85 % - Impacto principal
T1078Valid Accountsstealth · persistence · privilege escalation · initial access90 % - Impacto secundario
T1556Modify Authentication Processdefense impairment · persistence · credential access75 %
Explotación remota sin requerir autenticación previa (AV:N,PR:N,UI:N) de falla en validación de identidades OIDC que permite asumir identidades de otros usuarios locales. El atacante puede acceder como usuario autenticado sin credenciales válidas.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-290
Referencias
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-91039.html
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964
- https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-73j9-m294-fvv9
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-91039
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
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"value": "Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.\n\nThe strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as \"<name>/<connection_id>\", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-09-18T18:16:18.527",
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}