CVE-2026-89768
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: fix user path of nested backing files
backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened.
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Commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem.
As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts:
mapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user path:
The bogus path is derived from the f_path of the intermediate backing file, whose mount is a private clone that d_path() cannot resolve.
Fix this by using file_user_path(), which returns the outermost user-visible path for backing files and falls back to &user_file->f_path for regular files. This restores the behavior of commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") for overlayfs and also fixes the same problem for the other backing_file_open() callers, fuse passthrough and erofs ishare, when their user file is itself a backing file.
backing_tmpfile_open() has the same pattern but is not affected: it is only called by ovl_create_tmpfile() for the upper layer, and another overlayfs is rejected as upperdir by the DCACHE_OP_REAL check in ovl_mount_dir_check(), so its user_file can never be a backing file.
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested
echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \
/ovl/merged
# at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested
# readlink /proc/self/fd/3
/ovl/nested/foo
# grep foo /proc/self/maps
7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /fooCVSS
NVD no ha asignado puntuación CVSS a esta CVE (habitual desde el cambio de política de abril de 2026).
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.19%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 8
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-89768",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b6aa9a843205da92d860e5011a7b29062a76b8f",
"lessThan": "88c927a63dc717b6d46b20fe13ea713916e49089",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5dfcb15974e7d0f96aca278dd9f1b85df91523ef",
"lessThan": "c03114634d342648bd34910aa8fb88007e92cc3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987",
"lessThan": "a35cc21355734e1acb89973d9be90ca8e4c3ed2f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987",
"lessThan": "f2381b546e7e6a35c9fcee0d0ccb6c042a9aeb5d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "41c5b269af8b1f0bffcab7766a793f294ae6764e",
"versionType": "git"
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{
"status": "affected",
"version": "27e795afba0018b0ea9460dbad4bd706d1ba5ee0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12.95",
"lessThan": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.38",
"lessThan": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.144",
"lessThan": "6.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0.4",
"lessThan": "7.1",
"versionType": "semver"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/backing-file.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "7.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/backing-file.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-09-11T20:20:08.090",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88c927a63dc717b6d46b20fe13ea713916e49089",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a35cc21355734e1acb89973d9be90ca8e4c3ed2f",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c03114634d342648bd34910aa8fb88007e92cc3c",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2381b546e7e6a35c9fcee0d0ccb6c042a9aeb5d",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: fix user path of nested backing files\n\nbacking_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing\nfile from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself\nis a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems,\ne.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged\ndirectory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 (\"fs: store real path\ninstead of fake path in backing file f_path\") the f_path of a backing\nfile holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that\nthe user opened.\n\nCommit 924577e4f6ca (\"ovl: Fix nested backing file paths\") fixed this\nfor such configurations by passing file_user_path() from\novl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a (\"lsm: add\nbacking_file LSM hooks\") changed the first argument of\nbacking_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and\nderived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing\nthe problem.\n\nAs a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong\npath in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example,\nwith two nested overlayfs mounts:\n\n mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested\n echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo\n mount -t overlay overlay \\\n\t-o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \\\n\t/ovl/merged\n # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent\n mount -t overlay overlay \\\n\t-o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested\n\nmapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user\npath:\n\n # readlink /proc/self/fd/3\n /ovl/nested/foo\n # grep foo /proc/self/maps\n 7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /foo\n\nThe bogus path is derived from the f_path of the intermediate backing\nfile, whose mount is a private clone that d_path() cannot resolve.\n\nFix this by using file_user_path(), which returns the outermost\nuser-visible path for backing files and falls back to\n&user_file->f_path for regular files. This restores the behavior of\ncommit 924577e4f6ca (\"ovl: Fix nested backing file paths\") for\noverlayfs and also fixes the same problem for the other\nbacking_file_open() callers, fuse passthrough and erofs ishare, when\ntheir user file is itself a backing file.\n\nbacking_tmpfile_open() has the same pattern but is not affected: it is\nonly called by ovl_create_tmpfile() for the upper layer, and another\noverlayfs is rejected as upperdir by the DCACHE_OP_REAL check in\novl_mount_dir_check(), so its user_file can never be a backing file."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-09-11T20:20:08.090",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}