CVE-2026-89579
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels
bloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed bitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case.
First, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The addition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the fixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX. Subsequent updates can then write past the allocated object.
Second, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash is a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit() eventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit kernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit offsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative to the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or write before bloom->bitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
Keep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an in-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops argument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still selects the intended word in the full bitmap.
Compute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final size to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and keeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset.
Exploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86 kernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 7.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.17%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 5
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation95 % - Impacto principal
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreterexecution85 % - Impacto secundario
T1565.001Stored Data Manipulationimpact75 %
Vector AV:L/PR:L/UI:N con escalada de privilegios explícita ("local privilege escalation") desde CAP_BPF. Ejecución de código y corrupción de memoria por escritura fuera de límites.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11c1e836710dcba03e50454a4eedfdbaf8d3050e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/272fcb4ba6fab678db0eb966dc81c4c804bef64a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b7a13eccfcf97714ffc1ca6aa663d66d4a30e29
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80551bf8912c42d1e3d55eec6fa3c40f306c3de8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff481e12b3f127739f6a4ea7cef2c25dc12e056
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-89579",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "9330986c03006ab1d33d243b7cfe598a7a3c1baa",
"lessThan": "a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b",
"versionType": "git"
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{
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"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "5.16",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:42.127",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11c1e836710dcba03e50454a4eedfdbaf8d3050e",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/272fcb4ba6fab678db0eb966dc81c4c804bef64a",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b7a13eccfcf97714ffc1ca6aa663d66d4a30e29",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6183bc683f97f4317f7e84939ca7fff37c5688b",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff481e12b3f127739f6a4ea7cef2c25dc12e056",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Harden bloom filter sizing and indexing on 32-bit kernels\n\nbloom_map_alloc() has two 32-bit-specific problems when the computed\nbitmap reaches the U32_MAX fallback case.\n\nFirst, BITS_TO_BYTES(U32_MAX) is evaluated with 32-bit arithmetic. The\naddition performed by DIV_ROUND_UP wraps, so the map allocates only the\nfixed-size bloom filter object while keeping bitset_mask == U32_MAX.\nSubsequent updates can then write past the allocated object.\n\nSecond, fixing only the allocation size is not sufficient. The bloom hash\nis a u32, but set_bit() takes a signed long bit number and x86 test_bit()\neventually feeds the index to variable_test_bit(long, ...). On 32-bit\nkernels, hashes in [0x80000000, U32_MAX] therefore become negative bit\noffsets. x86 bt/bts with a memory operand interpret those offsets relative\nto the supplied base, so a map with bitset_mask == U32_MAX can read or\nwrite before bloom->bitset even after allocating the full 512 MiB bitmap.\n\nKeep the U32_MAX fallback, but split each hash into a word pointer and an\nin-word bit number before calling test_bit() or set_bit(). The bitops\nargument is then always in [0, BITS_PER_LONG - 1], while BIT_WORD(h) still\nselects the intended word in the full bitmap.\n\nCompute the bitset size from (u64)bitset_mask + 1 before passing the final\nsize to bpf_map_area_alloc(). This fixes the original under-allocation and\nkeeps the allocated storage consistent with the addressable bitset.\n\nExploitation note: local privilege escalation is possible on a 32-bit x86\nkernel using the under-allocation bug from a binary with CAP_BPF."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-09-14T13:19:12.303",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}