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CVE-2026-82429

Estado: AplazadaAlta (7.8)—

Description

The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.

A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or `chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host.

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The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.

This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with `supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Vulnerabilidad TOCTOU en binario setuid-root que permite escalada de privilegios (AV:L, PR:L) explotable por usuario sin privilegios. El atacante consigue ejecución de código como root y manipulación arbitraria de archivos del host mediante symlink race en revalidación de rutas.

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Execution PreventionThreat Intelligence ProgramRestrict Web-Based ContentRestrict File and Directory PermissionsPrivileged Account ManagementRemote Data Storage

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Apache — StormAI

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-82429",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-82429",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-14T19:59:35.240189Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "product": "Apache Storm Worker Launcher",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.0.0",
              "lessThan": "3.1.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "org.apache.storm:storm-core",
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-14T15:17:09.807",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/9vjqrt28g0mxg304vw6pw46cx72v4rvq",
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    },
    {
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/9",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-367"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Description\n\nThe setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking\nthe tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an\neffective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the\nentry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.\n\nA tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with\na symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or\n`chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker\nforces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.\n\nThis crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to\nenforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than\non pathnames re-resolved at call time.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with\n`supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher\nmust be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-14T20:58:48.430",
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org"
}