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CVE-2026-78619

Estado: AplazadaCrítica (9.8)—

Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.

The helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.

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The challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Vulnerabilidad en autenticación de dos factores explotable remotamente sin privilegios (AV:N, PR:N). Permite reutilizar códigos de recuperación de otras cuentas mediante coerción numérica, otorgando acceso no autorizado a cuentas ajenas (T1078) y potencial control de cuentas (T1556).

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Privileged Account ManagementApplication Developer GuidanceActive Directory ConfigurationVulnerability ScanningUser TrainingUser Account Management

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Punk — Plugin TotpAI

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-78619",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-78619",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-26T18:46:07.885115Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "modules": [
            "Punk::Plugin::TOTP"
          ],
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "0.05",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ],
          "packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Punk-TOTP",
          "packageName": "Punk-TOTP",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h"
          ],
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "totp_use_recovery"
            },
            {
              "name": "pp_h_use_recovery"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-25T22:17:06.403",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/source/include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h#L801-827",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/view/lib/Punk/Plugin/TOTP.pm",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/6",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-305"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-1025"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.\n\nThe helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.\n\nThe challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-08-26T20:18:02.843",
  "sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}