CVE-2026-72343
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.
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Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.
Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:
The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch.
Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle.
This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand.
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
- Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire
format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 8.4
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.20%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 8
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation85 % - Impacto principal
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact75 % - Impacto secundario
T1005Data from Local Systemcollection60 %
Vector AV:L/PR:N/UI:N indica escalada local sin privilegios. El fallo de memset() en dirección 0x10 causa DoS (kernel fault). Acceso a memoria de stats como impacto secundario.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-72343",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 2.5
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
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"versionType": "git"
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{
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{
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{
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"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.17"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "5.17",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:07.650",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),\nbefore mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero,\nbecause it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),\nwhich is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and\nkvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather\nthan NULL. The \"if (!buf)\" guard does not catch this, and\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes \"successfully\" with\npriv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.\n\nOnce channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor\nenables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes\nbuf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls\nmemset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.\n\nAllocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in\nmlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:\n\n - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that\n returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and\n use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().\n - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on\n stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire\n format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled\n by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.\n\nThe max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where\nmlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a\ndetach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev\ndoes not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when\nthe netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute\nbuf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based\non the reduced max_nch.\n\nAllocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns\nearly without (re)creating the agent. Clear\npriv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after\nfreeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a\nsubsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left\nfrom a previous enable/disable cycle.\n\nThis mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of\nsize max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating\nentries up to stats_nch on demand."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:38.163",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}