CVE-2026-72340
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block
The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers.
Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance.
Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.
Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one.
No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 7.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.18%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 6
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation75 % - Impacto principal
T1565.001Stored Data Manipulationimpact65 % - Impacto secundario
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact60 %
Vulnerabilidad local (AV:L/PR:L) que corrompe datos en hardware compartido (VCAP) mediante race condition. Permite corrupción de entradas (I:H) y negación de servicio potencial por corrupción del estado.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-72340",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26",
"lessThan": "786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1",
"versionType": "git"
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],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_vcap_impl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_vcap_impl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.h",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs_kunit.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_kunit.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_private.h"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
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"version": "6.2"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "6.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver",
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},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_vcap_impl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_vcap_impl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.h",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs_kunit.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_kunit.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_private.h"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:07.280",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block\n\nThe VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked\nindependently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are\nbacked by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and\ncommand registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL\nregister and moves data through the shared cache registers.\n\nAccessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The\nper-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a\ndifferent lock.\n\nThe locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of\nthe vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs\ndecodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache\nread) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule\nwrite to another Super VCAP instance.\n\nBesides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache\nbetween the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer\ncommits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry.\n\nIntroduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule\nlock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the\nper-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that\nserializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new\nadmin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the\ncontrol lock instead of a per-instance one.\n\nNo path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a\nsingle mutex cannot self-deadlock."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:37.763",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}