CVE-2026-68173
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion
ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still running and ubq->canceling is still set.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
The kick redispatches a previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.
ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress (F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.
Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting until the device is ready again.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 7.1
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.17%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 6
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation85 % - Impacto principal
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact75 % - Impacto secundario
T1561.002Disk Structure Wipeimpact70 %
Vulnerabilidad local (AV:L, PR:L) sin interacción que permite a un atacante con privilegios locales causar DoS persistente (hanging en fsync/teardown) y corrupción de datos (pérdida de operaciones FLUSH) al manipular el ublk kernel module.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-68173",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
},
"impactScore": 5.2,
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"lessThan": "7dd26adf7e7d482af524e3a0cca4a81ef7c159d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"lessThan": "8f188dd11a1c2ad94caeaee36ef68bb8221d4a12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "728cbac5fe219d3b8a21a0688a08f2b7f8aeda2b",
"lessThan": "432a9b2780c0a01caf547bd1fc2fcf28aeb8d173",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "42ea64e01c96e594fb4f80c54dfe4f934d008a6e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14.6",
"lessThan": "6.15",
"versionType": "semver"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "6.15",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:04.067",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/432a9b2780c0a01caf547bd1fc2fcf28aeb8d173",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd26adf7e7d482af524e3a0cca4a81ef7c159d0",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f188dd11a1c2ad94caeaee36ef68bb8221d4a12",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion\n\nub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If\nthe ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START\nfailed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by\nthe stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is\nmarked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still\nrunning and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a\npreviously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling\nand parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH\nclears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the\nrequest is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush\nmachinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible\nsleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a\nlost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.\n\nub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level\ncondition \"every queue has fetched all I/O commands\", which can regress\n(F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop\nit and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper\nublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via\nwait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then\nre-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns\nwith the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.\n\nReadiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that\nclears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the\ndevice LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling\nclears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can\nstill be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the\nfail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting\nuntil the device is ready again."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:18.770",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}