CVE-2026-68160
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:
ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays.
The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.
Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
snaptrace = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
if (snaptrace_len) {
...
if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
false, &realm)) { ... }CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 9.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.77%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 54
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access95 % - Impacto principal
T1005Data from Local Systemcollection90 % - Impacto secundario
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact70 %
Vulnerabilidad de lectura fuera de límites en kernel Linux explotable remotamente sin autenticación (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N) por MDS malicioso. Lee datos de memoria arbitrarios vía snaptrace_len manipulado (T1005) y puede causar denegación de servicio (T1499.004).
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-68160",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "a8599bd821d084d04a3290fffae1071624ec00ea",
"lessThan": "f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
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"lessThan": "4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02",
"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/ceph/caps.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.34"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "2.6.34",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver",
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},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/ceph/caps.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:02.300",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b417afce19ee6b6e61f1bbbbebac924c9f36d1",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c011137194036424e974677e0f1592e22a33d8c",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71893c342a26bcff92eaab0b2b75d64aed19308a",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9081c71796724ffe96cba253f68fbe42363c5295",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4228b93706fb74a484e6ffb271c1cc2af3a2ddb",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc93f68a31c9b831abf2db8647b5f5b10329d793",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f913192fc782288e060dafc329b2346934be34cc",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()\n\nceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format\nceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake\nend pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to\nceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:\n\n snaptrace = h + 1;\n snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);\n p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;\n ...\n case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:\n if (snaptrace_len) {\n ...\n if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,\n snaptrace + snaptrace_len,\n false, &realm)) { ... }\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm\nfrom snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)\nwith the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.\nWith snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially\nsatisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past\nthe legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /\nri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds\nreads of the encoded snap arrays.\n\nThe eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks\nabove the op switch each catch this OOB through their\nceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit\nbehind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised\nMDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with\nno version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The\nshape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.\n\nValidate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before\nconsuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()\nhelper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,\nguarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe\nfor the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where\np + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the\nrest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines\nbelow), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit\npath."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-19T17:20:33.317",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}