« Volver al listado

CVE-2026-68095

Estado: RecibidaSin puntuar—

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion

This fixes this race: - thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe -> fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref yet - thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() -> fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0 - thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes - thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs and calls "wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);" The abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as nothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring, queue, and ent are leaked.

Leer descripción completaMostrar menos

Fix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created ent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the scenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref and wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already waiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or if the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the async teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents and decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the eventual queue and ring teardown.

CVSS

NVD no ha asignado puntuación CVSS a esta CVE (habitual desde el cambio de política de abril de 2026).

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

Mostrar
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-68095",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {},
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "24fe962c86f55347385933a1b06ca71b60854690",
              "lessThan": "3bca70235a706de76fe9a81defd37d987062c686",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "24fe962c86f55347385933a1b06ca71b60854690",
              "lessThan": "2cd945492bc5b472e814272e88b731bb9bb17629",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "24fe962c86f55347385933a1b06ca71b60854690",
              "lessThan": "952b5d36f6a298f57c52a59e72076c69386a8aaf",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/fuse/dev_uring.c"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        },
        {
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.42",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.6",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/fuse/dev_uring.c"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "affected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-10T13:19:53.707",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cd945492bc5b472e814272e88b731bb9bb17629",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bca70235a706de76fe9a81defd37d987062c686",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952b5d36f6a298f57c52a59e72076c69386a8aaf",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse-uring: fix race between registration and connection abortion\n\nThis fixes this race:\n- thread a: io_uring_enter -> register sqe ->\n  fuse_uring_create_ring_ent -> allocate ent but doesn't grab queue_ref\n  yet\n- thread b: fuse_conn_destroy() -> fuse_chan_abort() ->\n  fuse_uring_abort() is a no-op due to queue ref being 0\n- thread a: grabs the queue_ref, queue_ref is now 1, rest of\n  fuse_uring_do_register() logic executes\n- thread b: fuse_chan_abort() returns, fuse_chan_wait_aborted() now runs\n  and calls\n  \"wait_event(ring->stop_waitq, atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) == 0);\"\nThe abort/unmount thread will hang indefinitely in unkillable state as\nnothing will decrement queue_refs or wake stop_waitq, and the ring,\nqueue, and ent are leaked.\n\nFix this by checking fch->connected under fch->lock after the created\nent has grabbed a ref count on the queue. This ensures that in the\nscenario above, it is guaranteed that we either release the queue ref\nand wake up stop_waitq (in case fuse_chan_wait_aborted() is already\nwaiting) in fuse_uring_do_register() when we detect !fch->connected, or\nif the connection is aborted after the check, it is guaranteed that the\nasync teardown worker will be running in the background cleaning up ents\nand decrementing the ent's ref on the queue, which will unblock the\neventual queue and ring teardown."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:08.757",
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}