CVE-2026-64262
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: end fuse_req on io-uring cancel task work
When io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING, PF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context), fuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns -ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only flips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd; it never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the fuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at dispatch time.
The fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and fuse_request_end() is never invoked.
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The originating syscall thread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until fuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection lifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never decremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until max_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does not imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits while the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for fuse_abort_conn() to clean up.
Ending the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send() is not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and ent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally on the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref.
Fix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the queue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and drop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last).
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
fuse_uring_send_in_task()
tw.cancel == true
err = -ECANCELED
fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags)
ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE
list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace)
ent->cmd = NULL
io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED)
/* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Puntuación base: 5.5
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.16%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 4
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
CWE
- NVD-CWE-Other
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse-uring: end fuse_req on io-uring cancel task work\n\nWhen io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING,\nPF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context),\nfuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns\n-ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only\nflips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd;\nit never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the\nfuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at\ndispatch time.\n\n fuse_uring_send_in_task()\n tw.cancel == true\n err = -ECANCELED\n fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags)\n ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE\n list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace)\n ent->cmd = NULL\n io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED)\n /* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */\n\nThe fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and\nfuse_request_end() is never invoked. The originating syscall\nthread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until\nfuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection\nlifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never\ndecremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until\nmax_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does\nnot imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits\nwhile the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for\nfuse_abort_conn() to clean up.\n\nEnding the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send()\nis not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and\nent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally\non the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref.\n\nFix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the\nqueue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and\ndrop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last)."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:17:24.950",
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