CVE-2026-63799
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/mmcid: Fix OOB clear_bit when CID is MM_CID_UNSET in fixup path
In mm_cid_fixup_cpus_to_tasks(), when rq->curr has the target mm and mm_cid.active is set, the CID is checked with cid_in_transit() before setting the transition bit. In per-CPU mode a newly forked or exec'd task can be running with mm_cid.cid == MM_CID_UNSET because CIDs are assigned lazily on schedule-in. With cid_in_transit() the guard passes for MM_CID_UNSET (no transit bit), converts it to MM_CID_UNSET | MM_CID_TRANSIT and stores it back; later mm_cid_schedout() feeds this to clear_bit() with MM_CID_UNSET as the bit number, triggering an out-of-bounds write.
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Symptoms: this is genuine memory corruption, but a bounded out-of-bounds write, not an arbitrary one. MM_CID_UNSET is the fixed sentinel BIT(31), so once the bad value reaches mm_cid_schedout() the cid_from_transit_cid() strip leaves MM_CID_UNSET, which fails the "cid < max_cids" convergence test and falls into mm_drop_cid() -> clear_bit(MM_CID_UNSET, mm_cidmask(mm)). The cid bitmap is embedded in the mm_struct slab object (after cpu_bitmap and mm_cpus_allowed) and is only num_possible_cpus() bits wide, so clearing bit 31 is a deterministic OOB bit-clear at a fixed offset of 2^31 / 8 == 256 MiB past the bitmap base. The address is not attacker-influenced (fixed sentinel -> fixed offset) and the op only clears a single bit; what sits 256 MiB further along the direct map is whatever kernel object happens to live there, so this corrupts one bit of unpredictable kernel memory -- it is not an arbitrary-address or arbitrary-value write.
It triggers only in per-CPU CID mode, when a CPU is running an active task of the target mm whose cid is still MM_CID_UNSET -- the fork()/execve() window before that task's next schedule-in assigns it a real CID -- and a per-CPU -> per-task fixup walks over it (the mode fallback driven by a thread exit, sched_mm_cid_exit(), or by the deferred max_cids recompute in mm_cid_work_fn()).
In practice syzkaller surfaced it as a KASAN use-after-free reported in __schedule -> mm_cid_switch_to, where the offending clear_bit() is inlined via mm_cid_schedout() -> mm_drop_cid().
Guard the transition-bit assignment against MM_CID_UNSET, in addition to the existing cid_in_transit() check, so the bit is only set on a genuine task-owned CID. A CPU-owned (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID of a running active task is handled by the cid_on_cpu(pcp->cid) branch above and never reaches this path, so excluding MM_CID_UNSET (and the already-transitioning case) is sufficient.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 7.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.13%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 2
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation80 % - Impacto principal
T1565.001Stored Data Manipulationimpact75 % - Impacto secundario
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact60 %
Vulnerabilidad local de corrupción de memoria (CWE-125: out-of-bounds write) en kernel Linux con PR:L/UI:N que permite escalada; impacto: manipulación de datos kernel y potencial DoS por corrupción de bit en memoria.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
CWE
- CWE-125
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/mmcid: Fix OOB clear_bit when CID is MM_CID_UNSET in fixup path\n\nIn mm_cid_fixup_cpus_to_tasks(), when rq->curr has the target mm and\nmm_cid.active is set, the CID is checked with cid_in_transit() before\nsetting the transition bit. In per-CPU mode a newly forked or exec'd\ntask can be running with mm_cid.cid == MM_CID_UNSET because CIDs are\nassigned lazily on schedule-in. With cid_in_transit() the guard passes\nfor MM_CID_UNSET (no transit bit), converts it to MM_CID_UNSET |\nMM_CID_TRANSIT and stores it back; later mm_cid_schedout() feeds this\nto clear_bit() with MM_CID_UNSET as the bit number, triggering an\nout-of-bounds write.\n\nSymptoms: this is genuine memory corruption, but a bounded out-of-bounds\nwrite, not an arbitrary one. MM_CID_UNSET is the fixed sentinel BIT(31),\nso once the bad value reaches mm_cid_schedout() the cid_from_transit_cid()\nstrip leaves MM_CID_UNSET, which fails the \"cid < max_cids\" convergence\ntest and falls into mm_drop_cid() -> clear_bit(MM_CID_UNSET,\nmm_cidmask(mm)). The cid bitmap is embedded in the mm_struct slab object\n(after cpu_bitmap and mm_cpus_allowed) and is only num_possible_cpus()\nbits wide, so clearing bit 31 is a deterministic OOB bit-clear at a\nfixed offset of 2^31 / 8 == 256 MiB past the bitmap base. The address is\nnot attacker-influenced (fixed sentinel -> fixed offset) and the op only\nclears a single bit; what sits 256 MiB further along the direct map is\nwhatever kernel object happens to live there, so this corrupts one bit of\nunpredictable kernel memory -- it is not an arbitrary-address or\narbitrary-value write.\n\nIt triggers only in per-CPU CID mode, when a CPU is running an active\ntask of the target mm whose cid is still MM_CID_UNSET -- the\nfork()/execve() window before that task's next schedule-in assigns it a\nreal CID -- and a per-CPU -> per-task fixup walks over it (the mode\nfallback driven by a thread exit, sched_mm_cid_exit(), or by the deferred\nmax_cids recompute in mm_cid_work_fn()).\n\nIn practice syzkaller surfaced it as a KASAN use-after-free reported in\n__schedule -> mm_cid_switch_to, where the offending clear_bit() is inlined\nvia mm_cid_schedout() -> mm_drop_cid().\n\nGuard the transition-bit assignment against MM_CID_UNSET, in addition to\nthe existing cid_in_transit() check, so the bit is only set on a genuine\ntask-owned CID. A CPU-owned (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID of a running active task\nis handled by the cid_on_cpu(pcp->cid) branch above and never reaches\nthis path, so excluding MM_CID_UNSET (and the already-transitioning case)\nis sufficient."
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"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:17:16.260",
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