CVE-2026-58482

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-58482",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-58482",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-20T17:33:19.793160Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 5.9,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"
        },
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.6
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Jovancoding",
          "product": "Network-AI",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": ">= 5.0.0, < 5.12.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-07-20T17:18:15.997",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
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    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
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      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
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  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-352"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-08-13T16:24:46.433",
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      "nodes": [
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          "cpeMatch": [
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              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "vulnerable": true,
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              "versionEndExcluding": "5.12.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0"
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          "operator": "OR"
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  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}