CVE-2026-58481
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix.
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This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.
CVSS
- Version: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Base score: 6.5
Exploitation probability (EPSS)
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.19%
- Percentile among all scored CVEs: 8
- Score date: 10/5/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST) estimates how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited in the wild within 30 days. It complements CVSS (impact) and CISA KEV (confirmed exploitation).
Affected technologies (1)
CWEs
- CWE-22, CWE-23
References
- https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3
- https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2
- https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p
- https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p
Raw JSON (NVD)
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