CVE-2026-56425
The Azure Active Directory (AAD) authentication implementation contained multiple weaknesses in its OAuth 2.0 authorization flow that could allow attackers to bypass important security guarantees provided by the protocol.
The application used the PHP session identifier (session_id()) as the OAuth state parameter. Because session identifiers are long-lived authentication credentials, exposing them in OAuth redirect URLs could leak valid session tokens through browser history, HTTP Referer headers, reverse proxies, access logs, or third-party infrastructure involved in the authentication flow. If obtained by an attacker, the leaked session identifier could potentially be used for session hijacking.
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Additionally, the implementation did not regenerate the session identifier after successful authentication, leaving authenticated sessions susceptible to session fixation attacks where an attacker forces a victim to use a known session identifier before login and later reuses that identifier after authentication.
The OAuth state value was also not implemented as a dedicated, single-use nonce. This weakened CSRF protections and increased the risk of replay attacks against the OAuth callback process.
The authentication flow further failed to enforce HTTPS for the configured OAuth redirect URI. If a non-HTTPS redirect URI was used, OAuth authorization codes and access tokens could traverse the network in plaintext, exposing sensitive credentials to network attackers.
Finally, OAuth error responses containing attacker-controlled GET parameters were logged verbatim. An attacker could inject control characters or crafted log content, leading to log forging, log injection, or corruption of audit records.
The fix introduces:
AAD Authentication Plugin (OAuth 2.0 / Azure Active Directory integration)
Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
* A dedicated cryptographically random OAuth state value. * Single-use state validation and invalidation. * Constant-time state comparison using hash_equals(). * Session identifier rotation after successful authentication. * Enforcement of HTTPS-only redirect URIs. * Sanitized and length-limited logging of OAuth error parameters.
CVSS
- Versión: 4.0
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Puntuación base: 9.3
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.46%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 38
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1203Exploitation for Client Executionexecution85 % - Impacto principal
T1078.004Cloud Accountsstealth · persistence · privilege escalation · initial access90 %
OAuth 2.0 bypass mediante session hijacking y fixation; requiere interacción del usuario (UI:A) en flujo de autenticación. Impactos: secuestro de sesión válida (T1078.004), potencial compromiso de credenciales AAD (T1556.004), y CSRF/replay (T1187).
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
CWE
- CWE-384
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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