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CVE-2026-54542

Status: DeferredLow (3.7)—

Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key.

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KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.

CVSS

Exploitation probability (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST) estimates how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited in the wild within 30 days. It complements CVSS (impact) and CISA KEV (confirmed exploitation).

Affected technologies (1)

⚠ AI-inferred from the description — NVD hasn't analyzed this CVE yet, these aren't verified CPEs.

Nimiq — NimiqAI

CWEs

References

Raw JSON (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-54542",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-54542",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-14T19:20:57.604270Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 3.7,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "nimiq",
          "product": "core-rs-albatross",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "< 1.6.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-14T16:17:12.377",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/eabfc3e21731b0628c3f933163a0f1e1864217bf",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.6.0",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-125"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-30T17:51:56.193",
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}