CVE-2026-54541
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk proof containing two TrieProofNode values with identical keys. TrieProof::verify calls TrieProofNode::child_index in primitives/src/trie/trie_proof_node.rs, where is_prefix_of accepts equal keys and KeyNibbles::get is called at the key length, returns None, and is unconditionally unwrapped.
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Untrusted ResponseChunk data reaches commit_chunks, put_chunk, and proof.verify before cryptographic proof validation, so the attacker does not need a valid proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Puntuación base: 3.7
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.44%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 36
- Fecha de la puntuación: 2/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-248
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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"value": "Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk proof containing two TrieProofNode values with identical keys. TrieProof::verify calls TrieProofNode::child_index in primitives/src/trie/trie_proof_node.rs, where is_prefix_of accepts equal keys and KeyNibbles::get is called at the key length, returns None, and is unconditionally unwrapped. Untrusted ResponseChunk data reaches commit_chunks, put_chunk, and proof.verify before cryptographic proof validation, so the attacker does not need a valid proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0."
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"lastModified": "2026-09-30T17:51:56.193",
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