CVE-2026-49323
Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.
CVSS
- Versión: 4.0
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Puntuación base: 4.1
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.14%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 3
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-327, CWE-798, CWE-1390
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-49323",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-49323",
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"version": "2.0.3",
"timestamp": "2026-05-29T13:31:09.706928Z"
}
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "cve@asrg.io",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"attackVector": "PHYSICAL",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 3.6,
"exploitabilityScore": 0.7
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "cve@asrg.io",
"cvssData": {
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"version": "4.0",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 4.1,
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackVector": "PHYSICAL",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"
}
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "cve@asrg.io",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "Indian Motorcycle",
"modules": [
"Wireless Control Module (WCM)",
"Engine Control Module (ECM)"
],
"product": "Scout Bobber + Tech",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2025",
"versionType": "model-year"
}
],
"platforms": [
"OEM Motorcycle"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-05-29T13:16:23.407",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://www.asrg.io/security-advisories/cve-2026-49323-indian-scout-wcm-ecm-weak-authentication",
"source": "cve@asrg.io"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "cve@asrg.io",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-327"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-798"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-1390"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Autenticación débil entre el Módulo de Control Inalámbrico (WCM) y el Módulo de Control del Motor (ECM) del modelo Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 permite a un atacante de red adyacente con acceso de lectura a la red del vehículo recuperar el secreto del inmovilizador del ECM por vehículo observando pasivamente un único intercambio de semilla/clave. El WCM deriva su respuesta utilizando una operación reversible y no criptográfica en lugar de un desafío-respuesta criptográfico, por lo que el secreto persistente del inmovilizador puede ser reconstruido a partir de un intercambio capturado. Con este secreto, el atacante puede autenticarse en el ECM independientemente del WCM y arrancar el motor, eludiendo el inmovilizador. Los detalles específicos del protocolo han sido retenidos a la espera de la remediación del proveedor."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-07-21T12:10:00.090",
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@asrg.io"
}