CVE-2026-45614

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-45614",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-45614",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-03T19:29:20.663892Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 4.7,
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 1
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "OP-TEE",
          "product": "optee_os",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "< 4.11.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-06-03T19:16:38.510",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/security/advisories/GHSA-g6qf-hwf7-mg9h",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/security/advisories/GHSA-g6qf-hwf7-mg9h",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-347"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Prior to version 4.11.0, on many of the ECDH shared secret paths, the public key isn't verified to be a point on the correct curve. By passing approximately 30-40 crafted public keys to OP-TEE, the private key can be reconstructed by a normal world attacker. When calling TEE_DeriveKey the public key is provided with full X and Y values, but the (X, Y) point might not satisfy the `Y^2 == X^3 + aX + b mod P` math for the specific curve that is used. When those public keys aren't rejected, the attacker can select public keys such that each DeriveKey call will leak `d % r` where `d` is the private key and `r` comes from the relationship between the correct curve and the attacker selected curve. With enough leaked data the Chinese remainder theorem can be used to recover the full private key. Version 4.11.0 fixes the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OP-TEE es un Entorno de Ejecución Confiable (TEE) diseñado como compañero de un kernel de Linux no seguro ejecutándose en núcleos Arm; Cortex-A usando la tecnología TrustZone. Antes de la versión 4.11.0, en muchas de las rutas de secreto compartido ECDH, la clave pública no se verifica para ser un punto en la curva correcta. Al pasar aproximadamente 30-40 claves públicas manipuladas a OP-TEE, la clave privada puede ser reconstruida por un atacante del mundo normal. Al llamar a TEE_DeriveKey, la clave pública se proporciona con valores X e Y completos, pero el punto (X, Y) podría no satisfacer las matemáticas 'Y^2 == X^3 + aX + b mod P' para la curva específica que se utiliza. Cuando esas claves públicas no son rechazadas, el atacante puede seleccionar claves públicas de tal manera que cada llamada a DeriveKey filtrará 'd % r' donde 'd' es la clave privada y 'r' proviene de la relación entre la curva correcta y la curva seleccionada por el atacante. Con suficientes datos filtrados, el teorema chino del resto puede usarse para recuperar la clave privada completa. La versión 4.11.0 corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-07-22T20:10:00.127",
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "negate": false,
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:trustedfirmware:op-tee:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "vulnerable": true,
              "matchCriteriaId": "7D076F24-9D13-4062-8D47-6ADB70693935",
              "versionEndIncluding": "4.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "OR"
        }
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  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}