CVE-2026-41670
Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the SAML IdP implementation in Admidio's SSO module uses the AssertionConsumerServiceURL value directly from incoming SAML AuthnRequest messages as the destination for the SAML response, without validating it against the registered ACS URL (smc_acs_url) stored in the database for the corresponding service provider client. An attacker who knows the Entity ID of a registered SP client can craft a SAML AuthnRequest with an arbitrary AssertionConsumerServiceURL, causing the IdP to send the signed SAML response -- containing user identity attributes (login name, email, roles, profile fields) -- to an attacker-controlled URL. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Puntuación base: 8.2
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.31%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 22
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1189Drive-by Compromiseinitial access85 % - Impacto principal
T1598.003Spearphishing Linkreconnaissance80 % - Impacto secundario
T1187Forced Authenticationcredential access75 %
XSS/redirección abierta en SAML: UI:R + navegador del usuario es redirigido (T1189). Roba credenciales/atributos de identidad (T1598.003: spear phishing con enlace malicioso SAML). Suplantación posterior (T1187).
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-20, CWE-601
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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