CVE-2026-33184
nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Puntuación base: 7.5
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.63%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 48
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access60 % - Impacto principal
T1499Endpoint Denial of Serviceimpact55 %
Inferido por reglas deterministas a partir del vector CVSS y la CWE. Solo orientativo.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
CWE
- CWE-191
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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