CVE-2026-15461
The Sierra Wireless HL78xx modem GNSS driver (drivers/modem/hl78xx/, later drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl78xx/) embeds a generic struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data match_data inside struct hl78xx_gnss_data. The generic NMEA0183 match helper (drivers/gnss/gnss_nmea0183_match.c) requires that context to be the first member because its callbacks cast user_data directly to struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data . In the affected releases match_data was the second member (after const struct device dev), so it sat at a non-zero offset while gnss_nmea0183_match_init() initialized it at the correct address.
Leer descripción completaMostrar menos
The registered NMEA handlers instead pass the whole device data object (data->devices.gnss->data, offset 0), producing an offset-shifted type confusion between where state is initialized and where the parse callbacks read and write it.
When NMEA sentences from the GNSS receiver are parsed, the GGA/RMC callbacks write parsed fix data into the wrong location within the struct, and the GSV callback (gnss_nmea0183_match_gsv_callback, active under CONFIG_GNSS_SATELLITES) reads its satellites pointer and bound from the wrong offsets — non-pointer bytes of struct hl78xx_gnss_data — and then writes parsed struct gnss_satellite entries through that bogus pointer. This is a write through an uninitialized/wild pointer with a garbage bound.
The NMEA handlers are registered by default (CONFIG_HL78XX_GNSS_SOURCE_NMEA is the default GNSS source) on devices using the HL78xx GNSS. The driver runs in kernel context and the NMEA data originates from the GNSS radio front-end, so a party able to influence the GNSS signal (for example GNSS/GPS spoofing at radio proximity) can drive the kernel-side parser into the faulty write. The most likely impact is a crash (denial of service) because the bogus pointer resolves to a fixed near-NULL value, with adjacent-memory corruption possible on MMU-less targets. Confidentiality is not affected. Exploitation requires the satellites feature to be enabled and active, so attack complexity is high.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Puntuación base: 5.3
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.16%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 4
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-843
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-15461",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-15461",
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"version": "2.0.3",
"timestamp": "2026-09-10T16:57:25.442788Z"
}
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
},
"impactScore": 3.6,
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"product": "zephyr",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.4.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
],
"packageName": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl78xx/hl78xx_gnss.h"
],
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hl78xx_get_gnss_data"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea0183_match_gga"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea0183_match_gsa"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea0183_match_gst"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea0183_match_gsv"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea0183_match_rmc"
},
{
"name": "hl78xx_gnss_nmea_match_epu"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-09-10T15:17:25.060",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/8a2465784e8909aa3835559381a60c00cc2218a1",
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-vvjg-6rg4-7235",
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-843"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Sierra Wireless HL78xx modem GNSS driver (drivers/modem/hl78xx/, later drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl78xx/) embeds a generic struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data match_data inside struct hl78xx_gnss_data. The generic NMEA0183 match helper (drivers/gnss/gnss_nmea0183_match.c) requires that context to be the first member because its callbacks cast user_data directly to struct gnss_nmea0183_match_data . In the affected releases match_data was the second member (after const struct device dev), so it sat at a non-zero offset while gnss_nmea0183_match_init() initialized it at the correct address. The registered NMEA handlers instead pass the whole device data object (data->devices.gnss->data, offset 0), producing an offset-shifted type confusion between where state is initialized and where the parse callbacks read and write it.\n\nWhen NMEA sentences from the GNSS receiver are parsed, the GGA/RMC callbacks write parsed fix data into the wrong location within the struct, and the GSV callback (gnss_nmea0183_match_gsv_callback, active under CONFIG_GNSS_SATELLITES) reads its satellites pointer and bound from the wrong offsets — non-pointer bytes of struct hl78xx_gnss_data — and then writes parsed struct gnss_satellite entries through that bogus pointer. This is a write through an uninitialized/wild pointer with a garbage bound.\n\nThe NMEA handlers are registered by default (CONFIG_HL78XX_GNSS_SOURCE_NMEA is the default GNSS source) on devices using the HL78xx GNSS. The driver runs in kernel context and the NMEA data originates from the GNSS radio front-end, so a party able to influence the GNSS signal (for example GNSS/GPS spoofing at radio proximity) can drive the kernel-side parser into the faulty write. The most likely impact is a crash (denial of service) because the bogus pointer resolves to a fixed near-NULL value, with adjacent-memory corruption possible on MMU-less targets. Confidentiality is not affected. Exploitation requires the satellites feature to be enabled and active, so attack complexity is high."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-09-10T17:17:01.853",
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}