CVE-2026-14535
In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely.
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This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 9.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.56%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 45
- Fecha de la puntuación: 5/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access60 %
Inferido por reglas deterministas a partir del vector CVSS y la CWE. Solo orientativo.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
CWE
- CWE-693
Referencias
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429
JSON original (NVD)
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"value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic."
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