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CVE-2026-13214

Estado: Pendiente de análisisCrítica (9.8)—

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON "key" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).

The GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system.

Leer descripción completaMostrar menos

The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose "key" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.

The consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Buffer overflow remoto sin autenticación (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N) en servidor OCPP accesible en red. Desbordamiento de pila permite DoS garantizado y RCE potencial según hardening; explotable desde punto central o MITM en conexión no cifrada.

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Filter Network TrafficVulnerability ScanningPrivileged Account ManagementNetwork SegmentationLimit Access to Resource Over NetworkApplication Isolation and Sandboxing

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Ocpp — OcppAI

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-13214",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-13214",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-25T15:15:40.750127Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.3.0",
              "lessThan": "4.4.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c"
          ],
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-25T05:17:20.060",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/afbf880b04188ae53451a0ade4ac62b654fdff34",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).\n\nThe GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose \"key\" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.\n\nThe consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "El cliente OCPP 1.6 en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contiene un desbordamiento de búfer de pila en parse_getconfig_msg(). Al manejar una solicitud GetConfiguration del sistema central, el gestor copió la cadena JSON 'key' controlada por el atacante en el búfer de pila fijo de 50 bytes del llamador (skey[CISTR50], declarado en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) usando un strcpy() sin límites. El valor de clave analizado apunta directamente al búfer de recepción, por lo que su longitud está limitada solo por el tamaño del mensaje (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, predeterminado 2048).\n\nEl mensaje GetConfiguration se entrega a través de la conexión WebSocket que el punto de carga abre a su sistema central configurado. El hilo lector ocpp_wsreader() lee el mensaje en ui -> recv_buf y lo despacha a parse_getconfig_msg() a través de la tabla de funciones PDU. Un atacante que controla el punto final del sistema central, o un man-in-the-middle en una conexión no cifrada, puede enviar una solicitud GetConfiguration cuando campo 'key' excede los 50 bytes y desbordar la pila del hilo lector con bytes elegidos por el atacante.\n\nLa consecuencia es un aplastamiento de pila (stack smash) activable remotamente en el hilo lector OCPP: como mínimo una denegación de servicio, y plausiblemente ejecución remota de código dependiendo del endurecimiento en tiempo de compilación, como los canarios de pila y la configuración de MPU. La solución reemplaza el strcpy() con un strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) con límites, seguido de una terminación NUL explícita, coincidiendo con las copias con límites ya utilizadas por los gestores hermanos."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-28T23:10:00.143",
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}