CVE-2026-107566

Status: DeferredMedium (6.5)—
Severity6.5Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploitation probability0.18 %higher than 7% of CVEs
Active exploitationNonot in the CISA catalog
Public exploitNot knownno public code found

Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to make the server send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a domain the server signs for. A Sieve script's editheader (addheader/deleteheader) could add or delete any header field except Received and Return-Path, and the server applies a script's header edits before it queues a redirect, so the redirected copy is sent as the script left it.

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The server signs a message's first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header wherever it signs DKIM for that domain and the message carries no signature of it. A script could therefore delete and re-add From - another account's address, or anyone's at a hosted domain - and redirect, so the server sent the message in that name and, for a hosted domain, signed it with that domain's DKIM key, a forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC; or, where another sender's domain is one the server signs for, delete the DKIM-Signature that sender's message arrived with, alter a field, and redirect, so the server re-signed the altered message as that sender's domain. editheader placed no restriction on From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature. The editheader action was introduced in 6.2.22. In the mail-rule engine, a domain's or an account's rule's Set header value action could likewise set From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature ahead of a forward or a copy, whoever the rule belonged to, so that an account acting on its own rules over COM, a domain administrator, or an API key confined to a domain (over the REST API from 6.3.4) could have the server forward or copy a message in the name of any address, signed, where that address is at a domain the server hosts with DKIM signing enabled, with that domain's key.

CVSS

Base score
6.5
Version
3.1
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Exploitation probability (EPSS)

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.18 %
Percentile among all scored CVEs
7
Score date
10/20/2026

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST) estimates how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited in the wild within 30 days. It complements CVSS (impact) and CISA KEV (confirmed exploitation).

ATT&CK techniques

How this vulnerability is exploited and what the attacker gains, in MITRE ATT&CK terms.

Vector AV:N con PR:L (usuario autenticado en red) y CWE-862; el atacante envía correo en nombre de otras direcciones firmado con DKIM mediante editheader o reglas, sin usar credenciales robadas (no aplica T1078).

Inferred by our analysis agent from the official description, CVSS vector and CWE, and checked by a supervisor. May contain errors.

ATT&CK mitigations that cover these techniques

Affected technologies (1)

⚠ AI-inferred from the description — NVD hasn't analyzed this CVE yet, these aren't verified CPEs.

CWEs

References

Show 2 references

Raw JSON (NVD)

Show
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-107566",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "cve@gitlab.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "cve@gitlab.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
          "vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
          "product": "hMailServer",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.6"
            }
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-10-19T16:17:01.460",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.7",
      "source": "cve@gitlab.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/83",
      "source": "cve@gitlab.com"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Primary",
      "source": "cve@gitlab.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to make the server send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a domain the server signs for. A Sieve script's editheader (addheader/deleteheader) could add or delete any header field except Received and Return-Path, and the server applies a script's header edits before it queues a redirect, so the redirected copy is sent as the script left it. The server signs a message's first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header wherever it signs DKIM for that domain and the message carries no signature of it. A script could therefore delete and re-add From - another account's address, or anyone's at a hosted domain - and redirect, so the server sent the message in that name and, for a hosted domain, signed it with that domain's DKIM key, a forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC; or, where another sender's domain is one the server signs for, delete the DKIM-Signature that sender's message arrived with, alter a field, and redirect, so the server re-signed the altered message as that sender's domain. editheader placed no restriction on From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature. The editheader action was introduced in 6.2.22. In the mail-rule engine, a domain's or an account's rule's Set header value action could likewise set From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature ahead of a forward or a copy, whoever the rule belonged to, so that an account acting on its own rules over COM, a domain administrator, or an API key confined to a domain (over the REST API from 6.3.4) could have the server forward or copy a message in the name of any address, signed, where that address is at a domain the server hosts with DKIM signing enabled, with that domain's key."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:14:14.150",
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@gitlab.com"
}