CVE-2026-107566
Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to make the server send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a domain the server signs for. A Sieve script's editheader (addheader/deleteheader) could add or delete any header field except Received and Return-Path, and the server applies a script's header edits before it queues a redirect, so the redirected copy is sent as the script left it.
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The server signs a message's first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header wherever it signs DKIM for that domain and the message carries no signature of it. A script could therefore delete and re-add From - another account's address, or anyone's at a hosted domain - and redirect, so the server sent the message in that name and, for a hosted domain, signed it with that domain's DKIM key, a forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC; or, where another sender's domain is one the server signs for, delete the DKIM-Signature that sender's message arrived with, alter a field, and redirect, so the server re-signed the altered message as that sender's domain. editheader placed no restriction on From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature. The editheader action was introduced in 6.2.22. In the mail-rule engine, a domain's or an account's rule's Set header value action could likewise set From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature ahead of a forward or a copy, whoever the rule belonged to, so that an account acting on its own rules over COM, a domain administrator, or an API key confined to a domain (over the REST API from 6.3.4) could have the server forward or copy a message in the name of any address, signed, where that address is at a domain the server hosts with DKIM signing enabled, with that domain's key.
CVSS
- Base score
- 6.5
- Version
- 3.1
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Exploitation probability (EPSS)
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
- 0.18 %
- Percentile among all scored CVEs
- 7
- Score date
- 10/20/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST) estimates how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited in the wild within 30 days. It complements CVSS (impact) and CISA KEV (confirmed exploitation).
ATT&CK techniques
How this vulnerability is exploited and what the attacker gains, in MITRE ATT&CK terms.
- Exploitation
T1210Exploitation of Remote Serviceslateral movement85 % - Primary impact
T1036Masqueradingstealth80 % - Secondary impact
T1565Data Manipulationimpact50 %
Vector AV:N con PR:L (usuario autenticado en red) y CWE-862; el atacante envía correo en nombre de otras direcciones firmado con DKIM mediante editheader o reglas, sin usar credenciales robadas (no aplica T1078).
Inferred by our analysis agent from the official description, CVSS vector and CWE, and checked by a supervisor. May contain errors.
ATT&CK mitigations that cover these techniques
Affected technologies (1)
⚠ AI-inferred from the description — NVD hasn't analyzed this CVE yet, these aren't verified CPEs.
CWEs
- CWE-862
References
Raw JSON (NVD)
Show
{
"id": "CVE-2026-107566",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
},
"impactScore": 3.6,
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
"vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
"product": "hMailServer",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0.0",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.6"
}
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-10-19T16:17:01.460",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.7",
"source": "cve@gitlab.com"
},
{
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/83",
"source": "cve@gitlab.com"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"type": "Primary",
"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Missing authorization in the Sieve editheader action (6.2.22 through 6.3.6) and in the mail-rule Set header value action (6.0.0 through 6.3.6) of Progressive Robot hMailServer allows an authenticated user to make the server send mail as any address, DKIM-signed where the address is at a domain the server signs for. A Sieve script's editheader (addheader/deleteheader) could add or delete any header field except Received and Return-Path, and the server applies a script's header edits before it queues a redirect, so the redirected copy is sent as the script left it. The server signs a message's first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header wherever it signs DKIM for that domain and the message carries no signature of it. A script could therefore delete and re-add From - another account's address, or anyone's at a hosted domain - and redirect, so the server sent the message in that name and, for a hosted domain, signed it with that domain's DKIM key, a forgery aligned to pass the domain's DMARC; or, where another sender's domain is one the server signs for, delete the DKIM-Signature that sender's message arrived with, alter a field, and redirect, so the server re-signed the altered message as that sender's domain. editheader placed no restriction on From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature. The editheader action was introduced in 6.2.22. In the mail-rule engine, a domain's or an account's rule's Set header value action could likewise set From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature ahead of a forward or a copy, whoever the rule belonged to, so that an account acting on its own rules over COM, a domain administrator, or an API key confined to a domain (over the REST API from 6.3.4) could have the server forward or copy a message in the name of any address, signed, where that address is at a domain the server hosts with DKIM signing enabled, with that domain's key."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:14:14.150",
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@gitlab.com"
}