CVE-2026-105437
Affected versions of Git have a heap buffer overflow in the three-way merge code (xdiff), which an attacker can trigger through a repository they control.
When Git merges a file, it first adds up the size of the merged output, allocates a buffer of that size, and then writes the output into it. That total was kept in a 32-bit signed integer. The conflict-marker-size attribute, which can be set from a committed .gitattributes file, accepts any positive integer, and the markers are written several times for every conflict.
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A small file with a huge marker size and many separate conflicts can therefore push the total past 4 GiB, so the integer wraps to a small value and Git writes attacker-controlled merge output past the end of a buffer that is too small. At minimum this crashes Git, and because the overflow is large and its contents are largely attacker-controlled, worse heap corruption is possible.
Any command that does a textual three-way merge can trigger it, such as git-merge(1), git-rebase(1), git-cherry-pick(1), and git-merge-tree(1). The latter is most likely a target for Git forges, which might use git-merge-tree(1) on the server-side to check mergeability. When the server reads attributes from trees in the repository (for example through attr.tree or --attr-source), any user who can push branches and request that they be merged (for example by opening a pull or merge request) can trigger the overflow without anyone else doing anything, and the data they push is small because the oversized output only appears during the merge.
The problem has been patched by computing the size as size_t and checking every addition for overflow, so Git stops with an error instead of overflowing.
Servers that cannot upgrade right away can add
* conflict-marker-size=7
to each repository's info/attributes as a workaround, which overrides any in-tree .gitattributes, or turn off server-side mergeability checks for untrusted repositories.
Timeline
Built from our own data: NVD, CISA KEV and other exploitation catalogues, FIRST EPSS, public exploits, specialised media and Orbitaley coverage.
- CVE record published in NVD
- First public exploit
- Record last modified in NVD
Public exploits
Exploit code or detection templates are publicly available. This is not the same as confirmed active exploitation (KEV), but it raises the risk: patch with priority.
- Proof of concept on GitHub (unverified) · List of proofs of concept on GitHub
⚠️ GitHub proofs of concept are not verified: some are fake or contain malware. Never run them outside an isolated lab.
ATT&CK techniques
How this vulnerability is exploited and what the attacker gains, in MITRE ATT&CK terms.
- Exploitation
T1203Exploitation for Client Executionexecution80 % - Primary impact
T1499Endpoint Denial of Serviceimpact85 %
El vector CVSS indica UI:R, lo que lleva a T1203; el texto dice que el desbordamiento 'at minimum crashes Git', lo que sustenta T1499 como DoS.
Inferred by our analysis agent from the official description, CVSS vector and CWE, and checked by a supervisor. May contain errors.
ATT&CK mitigations that cover these techniques
Affected technologies (1)
⚠ AI-inferred from the description — NVD hasn't analyzed this CVE yet, these aren't verified CPEs.
NVD record
- NVD status
- Deferred
- Published
- Nov 10, 2026
- Last modified
- Nov 16, 2026
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-122
References
Raw JSON (NVD)
Show
{
"id": "CVE-2026-105437",
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"timestamp": "2026-11-16T18:22:06.298762Z"
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"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
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"vendor": "Git",
"product": "Git",
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"published": "2026-11-10T19:17:46.200",
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"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/632121",
"source": "cve@gitlab.com"
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"descriptions": [
{
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"value": "Affected versions of Git have a heap buffer overflow in the three-way merge\ncode (xdiff), which an attacker can trigger through a repository they\ncontrol.\n\nWhen Git merges a file, it first adds up the size of the merged\noutput, allocates a buffer of that size, and then writes the output into\nit. That total was kept in a 32-bit signed integer. The\nconflict-marker-size attribute, which can be set from a committed\n.gitattributes file, accepts any positive integer, and the markers are\nwritten several times for every conflict. A small file with a huge marker\nsize and many separate conflicts can therefore push the total past 4 GiB,\nso the integer wraps to a small value and Git writes attacker-controlled\nmerge output past the end of a buffer that is too small. At minimum this\ncrashes Git, and because the overflow is large and its contents are largely\nattacker-controlled, worse heap corruption is possible.\n\nAny command that does a textual three-way merge can trigger it, such\nas git-merge(1), git-rebase(1), git-cherry-pick(1), and\ngit-merge-tree(1). The latter is most likely a target for Git forges,\nwhich might use git-merge-tree(1) on the server-side to check\nmergeability. When the server reads attributes from trees in the\nrepository (for example through attr.tree or --attr-source), any\nuser who can push branches and request that they be merged (for\nexample by opening a pull or merge request) can trigger the overflow\nwithout anyone else doing anything, and the data they push is small\nbecause the oversized output only appears during the merge.\n\nThe problem has been patched by computing the size as size_t and\nchecking every addition for overflow, so Git stops with an error\ninstead of overflowing.\n\nServers that cannot upgrade right away can add\n\n* conflict-marker-size=7\n\nto each repository's info/attributes as a workaround, which overrides\nany in-tree .gitattributes, or turn off server-side mergeability checks for\nuntrusted repositories."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-11-16T19:17:24.450",
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@gitlab.com"
}