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CVE-2026-102758

Estado: Pendiente de análisisAlta (7.5)—

The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.

The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.

nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c

Leer descripción completaMostrar menos

```

UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,

```

The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.

Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
code:

                                          USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,
                                          const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)

{

UINT   current_index;

USHORT current_tag;

ULONG  length;

ULONG  length_bytes;

    current_index = 0;
    current_tag = buffer[current_index];      /* <-- read before the bounds check */
    if (*buffer_length < 1)
    {
        return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
    }

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Lectura fuera de límites en parseo ASN.1 durante handshake TLS remoto (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N) causa DoS por crash; impacto disponibilidad confirmado (A:H).

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Filter Network TrafficVulnerability ScanningPrivileged Account ManagementNetwork SegmentationLimit Access to Resource Over NetworkApplication Isolation and Sandboxing

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Microsoft — Netx SecureAI

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

Mostrar
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-102758",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-102758",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-30T20:42:14.455455Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
          "product": "NetX Duo",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.5.2.202603"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "NetX Duo",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-29T18:17:13.047",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-f95g-xc4w-mrcr",
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-126"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.\n\n\n\nThe function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.\n\n\n\ncode:\n\n\n\nnx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nUINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,\n\n                                          USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,\n                                          const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)\n\n\n{\n\n\n\nUINT   current_index;\n\n\n\nUSHORT current_tag;\n\n\n\nULONG  length;\n\n\n\nULONG  length_bytes;\n\n    current_index = 0;\n    current_tag = buffer[current_index];      /* <-- read before the bounds check */\n    if (*buffer_length < 1)\n    {\n        return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);\n    }\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-30T21:17:05.347",
  "sourceIdentifier": "emo@eclipse.org"
}