Qilin
Also known as: agenda
Profile
Qilin, originally known as Agenda and tracked by Unit 42 as Spikey Scorpius, is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since August 2022 that has become one of the most prolific in the world. In 2025 it exceeded 700 victims in 62 countries, and in 2026 Cisco Talos ranks it second by number of observed incidents (behind The Gentlemen), Microsoft places it among the leading ransomware groups under several metrics, Nord Security attributes 363 attacks to it in the third quarter alone and Krebs on Security described it in November 2026 as the world's most active ransomware affiliate program, with at least 365 organisations claimed in three months. It has a particularly strong impact on the industrial sector, where it is considered the dominant actor of the year, in Italy, where it leads attacks together with LockBit 5, and in Japan, where Cisco Talos links it to incidents in the first half of 2026. Its affiliates, including the group Microsoft tracks as Storm-2570 (active since April 2025 across several RaaS ecosystems and focused on the United States, Canada, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Puerto Rico), combine data theft (sometimes without encrypting at all) and encryption; they get in mainly through vulnerable edge devices, especially Palo Alto GlobalProtect/Prisma Access VPNs (CVE-2026-0257, which lets them bypass MFA (multi-factor authentication) and which Arctic Wolf already saw exploited in July 2026, although a patch was already available when the activity was reported), as well as Check Point, Fortinet, WatchGuard and Cisco FMC, through remote access tools and with valid credentials on accounts without MFA; once inside they steal domain credentials, move laterally over RDP and SMB, pivot to vCenter and ESXi and deploy a Rust encryptor with versions for Windows, Linux and ESXi. According to leak-site claims tracked by Orbitaley, it has listed more than 2,200 victims (over 450 posted since June 2026), mainly in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Japan, and in professional services, manufacturing, construction, healthcare, logistics, legal, education, finance, energy, retail, hospitality, real estate and government, including claims against a US federal agency, a German political party, the government of a Pacific island state, an Australian judicial services body, a Japanese carmaker, a US newspaper chain, a pharmaceutical company, a US real estate company, a Turkish law firm and a French business services provider; confirmed attacks include one on the rugby club Stade Français Paris, which acknowledged it publicly, and the highest-impact incidents reported in the press include a Japanese brewer that suffered prolonged disruption of orders, shipments and services and exposure of data on 1.5 to 2 million people, and a UK pathology lab whose 2024 attack disrupted services at London hospitals. Evasion techniques stand out, such as running the Linux encryptor inside Windows through WSL, using vulnerable drivers (BYOVD) to disable EDR, extracting credentials from a domain controller's virtual disk and, according to Cisco Talos, using artificial intelligence to make its operations more efficient. It remains very active even though an alleged core member, a Russian national, was detained in Japan in May 2026 and extradited to Germany in October, as confirmed by Japanese authorities, accused of involvement in attacks on German companies, including the extortion of a logistics company in September 2024 for more than 160,000 dollars in cryptocurrency; in addition, in November 2026 researchers said they had identified the group's alleged administrator, a resident of St. Petersburg (Russia), based on operational security mistakes.
Active since: 2022-08
Initial access
- Exploitation of Palo Alto GlobalProtect and Prisma Access (CVE-2026-0257, authentication bypass that defeats MFA) and other known flaws in its VPNs to establish unauthorised VPN sessions and then steal domain credentials; exploitation observed since July 2026 (Arctic Wolf), confirmed by Unit 42 and ReliaQuest and shared with other ransomware groups such as INC and Settra
- Exploitation of the Check Point Security Gateway VPN (CVE-2026-50751, exploited as a zero-day)
- Exploitation of WatchGuard Firebox (CVE-2025-14733)
- Exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS/FortiGate vulnerabilities
- Exploitation of Cisco Firewall Management Center (FMC) vulnerabilities, including a critical one, to steal credentials and deploy the ransomware
- Compromised valid credentials (bought from brokers or obtained by RDP brute force), taking advantage of accounts without MFA
- Abuse of remote access tools (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Splashtop)
- Spearphishing emails with links
Tools
Qilin/Agenda encryptor in Rust (formerly Go) for Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi, Running the Linux encryptor through WSL, Vulnerable drivers (BYOVD, e.g. eskle.sys), dark-kill and HRSword to disable defences, Pivot to the virtualisation layer: vCenter access, disabling controls on ESXi and extracting credentials from a domain controller's VMDK, Scripts to destroy Veeam backups and deploy encryption via GPO, Cobalt Strike, BloodHound and SharpHound for Active Directory reconnaissance, RDP and SMB for lateral movement, Dual-use RMM tools: AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, MeshAgent, Atera, Remotely, Cyberduck, WinRAR, Rclone for exfiltration, including to cloud services
What defenders should watch
- Patch exposed VPNs and firewalls immediately: Palo Alto GlobalProtect/Prisma Access (CVE-2026-0257, also exploited by INC and Settra), Check Point (CVE-2026-50751), WatchGuard Firebox (CVE-2025-14733), FortiOS and Cisco FMC; since CVE-2026-0257 exploitation has been observed since July 2026, if the device was exposed unpatched, review GlobalProtect logs from that date for sessions without valid MFA and for the IPs published by Unit 42 (e.g. 146.19.216[.]119, 146.19.216[.]120, 146.19.216[.]125, 23.128.228[.]6, 104.207.144[.]154, 179.43.172[.]213, 185.195.232[.]139, 198.12.106[.]60, 202.144.192[.]47), watch for anomalous IKEv1 exchange attempts and, if there are signs of access, reset domain credentials.
- Protect the virtualisation layer: isolate the vCenter and ESXi management network, require MFA and separate accounts to administer it, and alert on disabled hypervisor controls or access to domain controller virtual disks.
- Require MFA on all remote access and do not expose RDP to the internet; inventory and restrict approved RMM tools and alert on new installations of ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Splashtop, Atera, MeshAgent or Remotely, on execution of Cobalt Strike, BloodHound or SharpHound, and on unusual lateral movement over RDP or SMB.
- Alert when WSL is enabled or installed where it is not used, block known vulnerable drivers, and monitor GPO changes and domain-wide scheduled task creation, a common route for deploying the encryptor.
- Protect backup servers (Veeam) with separate credentials, immutable or offline copies and an up-to-date Veeam Backup & Replication (CVE-2023-27532, cited in coverage of the group); watch for bulk data transfers with Rclone, Cyberduck or WinRAR and to cloud services, since the group also steals data without encrypting.
Most affected countries
- United States33
- Italy9
- Spain7
- Mexico6
- Japan5
- Germany5
- Malaysia3
- United Kingdom2
Most affected sectors
- Professional services70
- Manufacturing30
- Construction27
- Finance & insurance20
- Technology18
- Transport & logistics17
- Education14
- Legal13
Indicators of compromise 9
IPs, domains, URLs, hashes and files attributed to this group by the sources
Extracted from the public reports and news we read about this group, with the source for each one. Check them against your own telemetry; an indicator may be reused or expired.
| Indicator | Context | First seen | Last seen | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
IP 104.207.144.154 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 146.19.216.119 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 146.19.216.120 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 146.19.216.125 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 179.43.172.213 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 185.195.232.139 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 198.12.106.60 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 202.144.192.47 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
IP 23.128.228.6 | IP asociada a intentos de acceso GlobalProtect | Oct 19, 2026 | Oct 19, 2026 | Unit 42 |
Vulnerabilities attributed
| CVE | Severity | EPSS | Active exploitation |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-27532 | High (7.5) | 81% | ⚠ Active exploitation |
| CVE-2026-0257 | High (7.8) | 96% | ⚠ Active exploitation |
| CVE-2026-50751 | Critical (9.3) | 85% | ⚠ Active exploitation |
Priority mitigations
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations that cover the most techniques used by this group.
- Privileged Account Management (24 techniques covered)
- User Account Management (22 techniques covered)
- Network Intrusion Prevention (20 techniques covered)
- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint (16 techniques covered)
- Execution Prevention (15 techniques covered)
- Filter Network Traffic (14 techniques covered)
- Audit (14 techniques covered)
- Disable or Remove Feature or Program (13 techniques covered)
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
Techniques marked ✦ are not attributed to this group by MITRE ATT&CK: Orbitaley infers them from public reports (a tool it uses, a vulnerability it exploits or, by AI, its documented behaviour). The source is shown in brackets.
Recent victims
| Organisation | Country | Sector | Claimed | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Properties | — | Real estate | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| The Ashland Water Group | — | Manufacturing | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples | — | Government | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Hybrytec | — | Energy & utilities | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| IMS Messsysteme | Germany | Manufacturing | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Systems 4PT | — | Technology | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Agram Concern | — | Finance & insurance | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| A.I.M Cash & Carry | — | Retail | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Airways Aviation | — | Transport & logistics | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Ayala Property Management | — | Real estate | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| California Cross Dock | United States | Transport & logistics | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Fahrenheit DDB | — | Professional services | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Power Equipment | — | Professional services | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Arrigoni SpA | Italy | Manufacturing | 11/16/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Oregon Linen | United States | Professional services | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Cole Manufacturing | — | Manufacturing | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Kessler Soils Engineering Products | — | Manufacturing | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| The Heartland Construction Group | — | Construction | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Atlas Evaluation & Inspection Services | — | Professional services | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| 🔒 Empresa de fabricación | — | Manufacturing | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Kayaku Safety Systems Malaysia Sdn Bhd | Malaysia | Automotive | 11/15/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Wisconsin Timber Rattlers | United States | Media & entertainment | 11/14/2026 | ◌ Claimed (unverified) |
| Leonard's Express | — | Transport & logistics | 11/14/2026 | ✔ Confirmed |
| Oral Roberts University | United States | Education | 11/14/2026 | ✔ Confirmed |
| The University of Texas at Arlington | United States | Education | 11/14/2026 | ✔ Confirmed |
Claims are published by the criminal groups themselves and are unverified until the organisation or the press confirms them. Names of natural persons (sole traders, individual professionals) are anonymised under the GDPR. We never link to leak sites or stolen data. To request the removal or anonymisation of an entry, contact the site administrator.
Sources: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0), MITRE ATT&CK®, MISP Galaxy, Google News.