Vulnerabilidades

A command injection vulnerability in certain affected NETGEAR Nighthawk devices allows a network-adjacent attacker with the ability to intercept and modify local network traffic (attacker in the middle) to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the affected device.

A buffer overflow vulnerability in the listed NETGEAR models allows an authenticated admin user to cause the affected device to become temporarily unavailable.

A vulnerability in the affected NETGEAR gaming routers allows attackers with the ability to intercept and tamper with traffic between the router and the Internet, to execute code on the device.

Insufficient input validation vulnerability in the listed NETGEAR models allows authenticated administrators connected to the local network to make unauthorized modification of router software and functionality.

Insufficient configuration management in the listed devices allows authenticated administrators connected to the local network to tamper with the system.

Insufficient input validation vulnerability in the listed NETGEAR devices allows authenticated administrators connected to the local network to tamper with the router's integrity.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP…

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to…

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary…

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or…