Vulnerabilidades

GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 was discovered to utilize a weak hashing algorithm to protect the root password, possibly allowing attackers to obtain root credentials and privileges via a bruteforce attack.

A lack of runtime integrity in GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 allows physically-proximate attackers to bypass file system read-only protections and modify system files and binaries for the duration of a boot session via a bind-mount attack.

The factory reset functionality in GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 fails to clear sensitive cryptographic material in the JFFS2 configuration partition, possibly allowing attackers to recover and obtain sensitive user data.

GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 was discovered to store pre-signed Backblaze B2 upload URLs (PUT requests) in plaintext to the serial console. This allows physically-proximate attackers to extract these active tokens to perform unauthorized operations via monitoring the serial UART interface.

An issue in the U-Boot component of GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 allows physically-proximate attackers to bypass authentication and gain root access via interrupting the boot sequence and injecting a crafted string into the kernel boot arguments.

GNCC GP5 v7.1.76 was discovered to store sensitive wireless network information in plaintext during routine operations to the serial console. This issue allows physically-proximate attackers to obtain sensitive information, including network credentials, via monitoring the serial UART interface.

Authentication Bypass in GNCC's GC2 Indoor Security Camera 1080P allows an attacker with physical access to gain a privileged command shell via the UART Debugging Port.

Information Disclosure in GNCC's GC2 Indoor Security Camera 1080P allows an attacker with physical access to read the WiFi passphrase via the UART Debugging Port.

Identical Hardcoded Root Password for All Devices in GNCC's GC2 Indoor Security Camera 1080P allows an attacker with physical access to retrieve the root password for all similar devices