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CVE-2026-98271

Estado: RecibidaSin puntuar—

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: do not leave stale header offsets after pskb_carve()

pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() remove the first bytes of a packet and reallocate skb->head.

All the headers that were present before the operation are gone, but both functions call skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0), which is a no-op : skb->mac_header, skb->network_header, skb->transport_header and skb->csum_start keep their old values and now describe bytes which are no longer there.

Both helpers size the new head from the old skb_end_offset(), so the stale offsets still land inside the new allocation. They point past skb_tail_pointer() though, to bytes that were never initialized.

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pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() is the worst case, because it leaves a zombie skb with an empty linear part (skb->data == skb_tail_pointer(skb), skb_headlen(skb) == 0), while skb_mac_header_was_set() is still true and skb->mac_header is way ahead of skb->data.

The only user of pskb_extract() is rds_tcp_data_recv(), and the carved skb is queued on tinc->ti_skb_list. When the RDS incoming message is released, rds_tcp_inc_free() calls skb_queue_purge(), which frees the skbs with SKB_DROP_REASON_QUEUE_PURGE. This is visible from drop_monitor, which then tries to pull back to the (bogus) mac header :

skbuff: __skb_pull(len=234) skb len=6968 data_len=6968 headroom=0 headlen=0 tailroom=0 end-tail=384 mac=(234,14) mac_len=14 net=(248,40) trans=288 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1428 type=16 segs=5)) csum(0x100120 start=288 offset=16 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0) hash(0x7b446c6c sw=0 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=60 kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2847!

Add skb_carve_reset_headers() to mark the mac and transport headers as not set, reset the network header, clear skb->mac_len, and drop a now meaningless CHECKSUM_PARTIAL (csum_start no longer describes anything).

Invalidate the inner offsets as well. Unlike mac_header and transport_header they have no "unset" sentinel, so a leftover non-zero value still looks like a real header. Zero skb->inner_mac_header, skb->inner_network_header, skb->inner_transport_header, skb->inner_protocol and skb->encapsulation, so that all the header state is invalidated in one place.

Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original
v2: fixed an inaccurate changelog. The stale offsets stay inside the
    new skb->head, which is never smaller than the old one, they
    simply point past skb_tail_pointer() to bytes that are gone.
    Thanks to Xuanqiang Luo for insisting on this.
    Also invalidate the inner header state, as suggested by the
    netdev AI review :
    https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260911114922.621937-1-edumazet%40google.com

CVSS

NVD no ha asignado puntuación CVSS a esta CVE (habitual desde el cambio de política de abril de 2026).

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-98271",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {},
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6fa01ccd883021105e9f8af7d04b9f156fa3494a",
              "lessThan": "75e4a3e62531738c124c8555a626426fca29d392",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6fa01ccd883021105e9f8af7d04b9f156fa3494a",
              "lessThan": "bff8a8e53a6d290bc2777bde36d3cb6317b8463d",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6fa01ccd883021105e9f8af7d04b9f156fa3494a",
              "lessThan": "12929ed66a5166177ef5f06d3da81e4f99993e90",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6fa01ccd883021105e9f8af7d04b9f156fa3494a",
              "lessThan": "a5117e1eccac6ee3bd4aed7cacf8ebcb6b3eb309",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
            "net/core/skbuff.c"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        },
        {
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "product": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.7"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "4.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.112",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.54",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.8",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3-rc4",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
            "net/core/skbuff.c"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "affected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:18:16.627",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12929ed66a5166177ef5f06d3da81e4f99993e90",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75e4a3e62531738c124c8555a626426fca29d392",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5117e1eccac6ee3bd4aed7cacf8ebcb6b3eb309",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bff8a8e53a6d290bc2777bde36d3cb6317b8463d",
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: skbuff: do not leave stale header offsets after pskb_carve()\n\npskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() remove\nthe first bytes of a packet and reallocate skb->head.\n\nAll the headers that were present before the operation are gone,\nbut both functions call skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0), which\nis a no-op : skb->mac_header, skb->network_header,\nskb->transport_header and skb->csum_start keep their old values and\nnow describe bytes which are no longer there.\n\nBoth helpers size the new head from the old skb_end_offset(), so the\nstale offsets still land inside the new allocation. They point past\nskb_tail_pointer() though, to bytes that were never initialized.\n\npskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() is the worst case, because it leaves a\nzombie skb with an empty linear part (skb->data ==\nskb_tail_pointer(skb), skb_headlen(skb) == 0), while\nskb_mac_header_was_set() is still true and skb->mac_header is way\nahead of skb->data.\n\nThe only user of pskb_extract() is rds_tcp_data_recv(), and the\ncarved skb is queued on tinc->ti_skb_list. When the RDS incoming\nmessage is released, rds_tcp_inc_free() calls skb_queue_purge(),\nwhich frees the skbs with SKB_DROP_REASON_QUEUE_PURGE. This is\nvisible from drop_monitor, which then tries to pull back to the\n(bogus) mac header :\n\nskbuff: __skb_pull(len=234)\nskb len=6968 data_len=6968 headroom=0 headlen=0 tailroom=0\nend-tail=384 mac=(234,14) mac_len=14 net=(248,40) trans=288\nshinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1428 type=16 segs=5))\ncsum(0x100120 start=288 offset=16 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)\nhash(0x7b446c6c sw=0 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=60\nkernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2847!\n\nAdd skb_carve_reset_headers() to mark the mac and transport headers\nas not set, reset the network header, clear skb->mac_len, and drop\na now meaningless CHECKSUM_PARTIAL (csum_start no longer describes\nanything).\n\nInvalidate the inner offsets as well. Unlike mac_header and\ntransport_header they have no \"unset\" sentinel, so a leftover\nnon-zero value still looks like a real header. Zero\nskb->inner_mac_header, skb->inner_network_header,\nskb->inner_transport_header, skb->inner_protocol and\nskb->encapsulation, so that all the header state is invalidated in\none place.\n\nv2: fixed an inaccurate changelog. The stale offsets stay inside the\n    new skb->head, which is never smaller than the old one, they\n    simply point past skb_tail_pointer() to bytes that are gone.\n    Thanks to Xuanqiang Luo for insisting on this.\n    Also invalidate the inner header state, as suggested by the\n    netdev AI review :\n    https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260911114922.621937-1-edumazet%40google.com"
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:16.627",
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}