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CVE-2026-97228

Estado: Pendiente de análisisBaja (2.7)—

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: "...")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

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Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Explotación corregida por reglas (vector CVSS): era T1190

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-97228",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-97228",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-25T10:53:09.339314Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "cve@rapid7.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 2.7,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"
        },
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.2
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "cve@rapid7.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "http://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp",
          "vendor": "Rapid7",
          "modules": [
            "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP"
          ],
          "product": "Platform",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "lessThan": "0.6.2",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:02.163",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp/releases/tag/v0.6.2",
      "source": "cve@rapid7.com"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "cve@rapid7.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-943"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: \"...\")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.\n\nNotably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`)."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-25T13:26:09.190",
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@rapid7.com"
}