CVE-2026-85491
Catalyst::Seal versions before 0.03 for Perl allow one request to disable a path or route a later one past an authorization check via a dispatch memo keyed on the request path alone.
Catalyst::Seal replaces the dispatcher's prepare_action with a version that memoises how a path resolved: which dispatch type matched, at which level, and what was left over as arguments. The key is the request path and nothing else. Action roles that match on the method, content type, scheme or query make that resolution depend on state the key does not carry, so the memo answers for a request it was not built from.
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A path that resolves to no action is memoised as well, and replaying that entry returns without consulting any dispatch type, so no action is set and the request fails. A GET of a path whose action is declared POST-only therefore disables that path for every later request, the correct POST included. An entry that did resolve replays the level the earlier descent reached. Where a POST-only action sits below a shallower action on the same path, a GET memoises the shallow route, and a later POST is dispatched there with an auto() guarding the deeper controller never running.
The memo is cleared only when an action is registered, which happens at setup, so an entry lasts for the life of the process, and its cap of 2048 entries bounds how many paths one caller can disable. In the configuration measured, the misroute lands on the less privileged action, so it is an authorization check not running rather than a privilege gain.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 8.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.36%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 27
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1210Exploitation of Remote Serviceslateral movement75 %
Vector AV:N/PR:L permite explotación de servicio remoto autenticado (T1210). Bypass de autorización expone credenciales/sesiones válidas (T1078) y manipulación de flujo de solicitudes (T1565.001).
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-706, CWE-1023
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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{
"id": "CVE-2026-85491",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-85491",
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"version": "2.0.3",
"timestamp": "2026-09-25T16:34:58.812834Z"
}
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"affectedData": [
{
"modules": [
"Catalyst::Seal"
],
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "0.03",
"versionType": "custom"
}
],
"packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Catalyst-Seal",
"packageName": "Catalyst-Seal",
"programFiles": [
"lib/Catalyst/Seal/Dispatch.pm"
],
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Catalyst::Seal::Dispatch::_prepare_action"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-09-24T22:17:02.027",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Catalyst-Seal-0.02/source/lib/Catalyst/Seal/Dispatch.pm#L237-280",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Catalyst-Seal-0.03/changes",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
},
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/24/8",
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
},
{
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/24/9",
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-706"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-1023"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Catalyst::Seal versions before 0.03 for Perl allow one request to disable a path or route a later one past an authorization check via a dispatch memo keyed on the request path alone.\n\nCatalyst::Seal replaces the dispatcher's prepare_action with a version that memoises how a path resolved: which dispatch type matched, at which level, and what was left over as arguments. The key is the request path and nothing else. Action roles that match on the method, content type, scheme or query make that resolution depend on state the key does not carry, so the memo answers for a request it was not built from.\n\nA path that resolves to no action is memoised as well, and replaying that entry returns without consulting any dispatch type, so no action is set and the request fails. A GET of a path whose action is declared POST-only therefore disables that path for every later request, the correct POST included. An entry that did resolve replays the level the earlier descent reached. Where a POST-only action sits below a shallower action on the same path, a GET memoises the shallow route, and a later POST is dispatched there with an auto() guarding the deeper controller never running.\n\nThe memo is cleared only when an action is registered, which happens at setup, so an entry lasts for the life of the process, and its cap of 2048 entries bounds how many paths one caller can disable. In the configuration measured, the misroute lands on the less privileged action, so it is an authorization check not running rather than a privilege gain."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T17:17:16.240",
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}