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CVE-2026-84897

Estado: RecibidaMedia (6.9)—

src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

FIRST aún no ha puntuado esta CVE (habitual en CVEs muy recientes o rechazadas).

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Servidor SSH (wolfSSL wolfSSH) acepta mensajes de intercambio de claves malformados sin autenticación previa (AV:N/PR:N), causando validación criptográfica costosa (Miller-Rabin en primos de 8192 bits) que agota recursos del servidor en DoS por computación.

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

Mostrar
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-84897",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "facts@wolfssl.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "version": "4.0",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 6.9,
          "Automatable": "YES",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh",
          "vendor": "wolfSSL Inc.",
          "modules": [
            "key exchange"
          ],
          "product": "wolfSSH",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "changes": [
                {
                  "at": "1.6.0",
                  "status": "unaffected"
                }
              ],
              "version": "1.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "programFiles": [
            "src/internal.c"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "IsMessageAllowedServer"
            },
            {
              "name": "DoKexDhGexGroup"
            },
            {
              "name": "ValidateKexDhGexGroup"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-10-07T03:17:00.067",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/commit/a472f1ee2b653f623d85ef2297321733f1dbfd22",
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssh/pull/1221",
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3526.html",
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4419.html",
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "facts@wolfssl.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-372"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-405"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-10-07T03:17:00.067",
  "sourceIdentifier": "facts@wolfssl.com"
}