CVE-2026-72209
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate attribute values on lookup
ntfs_attr_find() and ntfs_external_attr_find() check that generic resident attribute values fit in their attribute records and that fixed-size resident values are large enough. For variable-length resident formats, however, the fixed part is not enough: embedded length fields can still point callers past the resident value.
A crafted image can set a small resident $FILE_NAME value_length while leaving file_name_length large.
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Callers then trust file_name_length and read past the resident value when converting or comparing the name. This was reproduced with a crafted image under KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds read from the kmalloc-1k MFT record copy. The stack included ntfs_lookup(), ntfs_iget(), ntfs_read_locked_inode(), ntfs_attr_name_get(), ntfs_ucstonls(), and utf16s_to_utf8s().
Add a shared attribute value validator and use it before a lookup path can return an attribute, including the AT_UNUSED enumeration case where callers inspect returned attributes directly. The helper validates resident value bounds, minimum resident value sizes, variable-length $FILE_NAME fields, and non-resident mapping-pairs metadata that was previously checked separately in both lookup paths.
This also preserves the intended resident @val matching semantics in the external attribute lookup path. The old duplicated validation block overwrote the actual resident value length with the type-specific minimum length before comparing @val, so variable-length resident values could fail to match even when the bytes were identical. Keep the comparison on the actual value length, and make ntfs_attrlist_entry_add() compare resident attributes with lowest_vcn zero instead of reading the non-resident union member after a successful resident match.
Reject non-resident $FILE_NAME records too: the format requires $FILE_NAME to be resident and callers treat returned records as resident.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 9.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.55%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 44
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access85 % - Impacto principal
T1005Data from Local Systemcollection90 % - Impacto secundario
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact75 %
Vulnerabilidad de lectura fuera de límites (slab-out-of-bounds) en kernel Linux accesible por red sin autenticación (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N). Permite leer datos de memoria del sistema de ficheros NTFS (T1005) y potencial DoS (T1499.004).
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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{
"id": "CVE-2026-72209",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"cvssData": {
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
},
"impactScore": 5.9,
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9
}
]
},
"affected": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"affectedData": [
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6ceb4cc81ef3409ff79dcb959771f9110787397a",
"lessThan": "e4c36dfac57a7261e9aeb0f3a7f30944a8aefb56",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6ceb4cc81ef3409ff79dcb959771f9110787397a",
"lessThan": "d5803e3345dae9c6470bb61869885236276b9a35",
"versionType": "git"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs/attrib.c",
"fs/ntfs/attrlist.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
},
{
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"product": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "7.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver",
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*"
}
],
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs/attrib.c",
"fs/ntfs/attrlist.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"published": "2026-08-15T06:21:39.607",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5803e3345dae9c6470bb61869885236276b9a35",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4c36dfac57a7261e9aeb0f3a7f30944a8aefb56",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate attribute values on lookup\n\nntfs_attr_find() and ntfs_external_attr_find() check that generic\nresident attribute values fit in their attribute records and that\nfixed-size resident values are large enough. For variable-length resident\nformats, however, the fixed part is not enough: embedded length fields\ncan still point callers past the resident value.\n\nA crafted image can set a small resident $FILE_NAME value_length while\nleaving file_name_length large. Callers then trust file_name_length and\nread past the resident value when converting or comparing the name. This\nwas reproduced with a crafted image under KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds\nread from the kmalloc-1k MFT record copy. The stack included\nntfs_lookup(), ntfs_iget(), ntfs_read_locked_inode(), ntfs_attr_name_get(),\nntfs_ucstonls(), and utf16s_to_utf8s().\n\nAdd a shared attribute value validator and use it before a lookup path\ncan return an attribute, including the AT_UNUSED enumeration case where\ncallers inspect returned attributes directly. The helper validates\nresident value bounds, minimum resident value sizes, variable-length\n$FILE_NAME fields, and non-resident mapping-pairs metadata that was\npreviously checked separately in both lookup paths.\n\nThis also preserves the intended resident @val matching semantics in the\nexternal attribute lookup path. The old duplicated validation block\noverwrote the actual resident value length with the type-specific minimum\nlength before comparing @val, so variable-length resident values could\nfail to match even when the bytes were identical. Keep the comparison on\nthe actual value length, and make ntfs_attrlist_entry_add() compare\nresident attributes with lowest_vcn zero instead of reading the\nnon-resident union member after a successful resident match.\n\nReject non-resident $FILE_NAME records too: the format requires\n$FILE_NAME to be resident and callers treat returned records as resident."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:21.803",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}