CVE-2026-64586
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr.
Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock.
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Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.
Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.
The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers.
This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
CVSS
- Versión: 3.1
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Puntuación base: 8.8
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.25%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 15
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1210Exploitation of Remote Serviceslateral movement45 % - Impacto principal
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalationprivilege escalation70 % - Impacto secundario
T1499.004Application or System Exploitationimpact60 %
Vulnerabilidad de use-after-free en controlador WiFi del kernel Linux que requiere acceso a red adyacente (AV:A) y permite escalada de privilegios o DoS. T1068 como impacto principal por ejecución de código en contexto de kernel tras dereferenciar memoria liberada.
Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
Referencias
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683
JSON original (NVD)
Mostrar
{
"id": "CVE-2026-64586",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
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{
"type": "Secondary",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"version": "3.1",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
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"affectedData": [
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"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
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{
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"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected"
}
]
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],
"published": "2026-08-06T08:16:33.830",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e",
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
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{
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal\n\nbrcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs \"reset\" entry both schedule\ndrvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()\nand dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free ->\nwiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending\nor running during removal can outlive drvr.\n\nCancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work\ncallback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe\nbrcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset ->\nbrcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for\nthe running work and deadlock.\n\nAdd a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through\nbrcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is\nmarked removing. Each bus remove entry calls\nbrcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing\nand cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes\nthe set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming\npath from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in\nthe threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail\npath runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in\nsleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the\nfirmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;\non SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which\nalso reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is\ninitialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees\ndrvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;\nresume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.\n\nAlso guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire\nbefore brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr\n(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.\n\nThe bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to\nevery remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),\nSDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the\ndebugfs \"reset\" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending\nbus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the\nscratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released\nthose DMA buffers.\n\nThis patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does\nnot attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the\nasynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That\ncallback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked\nseparately.\n\nThis issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-08-23T13:16:32.270",
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}