CVE-2026-57494
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent.
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Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix.
CVSS
- Versión: 4.0
- Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Puntuación base: 7.1
Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)
- Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.37%
- Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 29
- Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).
🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK
Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.
- Explotación
T1210Exploitation of Remote Serviceslateral movement60 % - Impacto principal
T1078Valid Accountsstealth · persistence · privilege escalation · initial access55 %
Inferido por reglas deterministas a partir del vector CVSS y la CWE. Solo orientativo.
🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas
Tecnologías afectadas (1)
⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.
CWE
- CWE-639, CWE-862
Referencias
JSON original (NVD)
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{
"id": "CVE-2026-57494",
"cveTags": [],
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-57494",
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"version": "2.0.3",
"timestamp": "2026-07-21T13:13:34.696485Z"
}
}
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"cvssMetricV40": [
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"version": "4.0",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"
}
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"affected": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"affectedData": [
{
"vendor": "agenticmail",
"product": "@agenticmail/api",
"versions": [
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"published": "2026-07-20T22:17:16.970",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm",
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
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"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm",
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
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"description": [
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"value": "CWE-639"
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{
"lang": "en",
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix."
}
],
"lastModified": "2026-07-23T16:04:11.740",
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}