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CVE-2026-54051

Estado: AplazadaCrítica (9.9)—

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.

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The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Vulnerabilidad de inyección de comandos shell en Node.js con acceso de red autenticado (PR:L). El bypass del allowlist mediante wildcards en /bin/sh -c permite ejecución arbitraria de comandos con impacto crítico (C:H/I:H/A:H). Acceso remoto requerido y privilegios de usuario (Network-AI agent conte

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-54051",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-54051",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-21T16:01:55.719735Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 9.9,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
        },
        "impactScore": 6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Jovancoding",
          "product": "Network-AI",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "< 5.9.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-07-20T17:17:57.643",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/379f77656b578144e03415c5b134d8309a4b5792",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666",
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-07-23T16:04:11.740",
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}