CVE-2026-19740

{
  "id": "CVE-2026-19740",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-19740",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T17:06:45.803944Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.4.0",
              "lessThan": "4.5.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_phy.c"
          ],
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "llcp_lp_pu_rx"
            },
            {
              "name": "llcp_rp_pu_rx"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-10-11T18:16:59.290",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/06bf10e3de16b57b864f969330188b59f7d69a63",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-rgw4-3qr8-pp36",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-401"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-459"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-617"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-772"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Link Layer Control Procedure (LLCP) implementation of the Zephyr software Bluetooth LE Controller retains the receive node that carried an accepted LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND so that it can later be reused for the host notification when the update instant is reached (llcp_rx_node_retain() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp.c, and the node is deliberately not recycled while marked NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN). The invalid-PDU arms of llcp_lp_pu_rx() and llcp_rp_pu_rx() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_phy.c completed the procedure via llcp_lr_complete() / llcp_rr_complete() without first releasing that retained node, so the procedure context — the only remaining reference to the node — was freed while the node was still held out of the receive pool.\n\nA peer device on an established LE connection can drive this deterministically and without pairing or encryption. Against a peripheral it sends LL_PHY_REQ, receives LL_PHY_RSP, sends a valid LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (so the node becomes retained), and then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ; ull_cp_rx() routes it to the active remote PHY Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The mirror case applies to a locally initiated PHY Update followed by an LL_REJECT_IND.\n\nIn the default configuration (CONFIG_BT_ASSERT and CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG both default y) the violated invariant in llcp_lr_check_done() / llcp_rr_check_done() triggers a controller assertion, ending in k_oops() (or k_panic()) — a single crafted PDU sequence from radio range faults the device. With those assertions compiled out, each attempt silently leaks one receive PDU node and its memq link; because the controller receive pool is small (PDU_RX_CNT, driven by CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1) and each attempt costs the attacker only a reconnect, a few repetitions exhaust the pool and leave Bluetooth inoperable until reboot. On releases v3.4.0 through v3.7.x the assertion is never reached, whatever the configuration, so every attempt leaks silently.\n\nThe impact is limited to availability: the orphaned node leaves no dangling pointer that is later dereferenced and is never delivered to the host, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. The same pull request applies the identical release to the Connection Update and CIS-create procedures, whose invalid-PDU arms had the same omission."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-10-16T18:17:57.483",
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}