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CVE-2026-13089

Estado: AplazadaAlta (7.5)—

OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.

When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).

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The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.

Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

Explotación remota sin autenticación (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N) de verificación de firma JWT. El impacto es suplantación de identidad (T1556: modificación de mecanismo de autenticación) y acceso como usuario arbitrario (T1078).

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Privileged Account ManagementUser Account ManagementPassword PoliciesMulti-factor AuthenticationApplication Developer GuidanceActive Directory Configuration

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Oidc — LiteAI

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

Mostrar
{
  "id": "CVE-2026-13089",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-13089",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-27T17:32:56.996183Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "repo": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite",
          "vendor": "RITOU",
          "product": "OIDC::Lite",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.12.1"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "OIDC-Lite",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/OIDC/Lite/Model/IDToken.pm"
          ],
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-07-22T21:17:12.743",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#section-3.1",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite/0.10/CVE-2026-13089-r1.patch",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    },
    {
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/17",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-347"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.\n\nWhen the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).\n\nThe ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.\n\nNote that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-07-27T18:16:51.057",
  "sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}