CVE-2026-103651

Estado: AplazadaAlta (7.6)—

MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.

The HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user's session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.

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Preconditions:

- The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.

- The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).

- The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).

Security impact:

- Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user's MISP account.

- Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.

Affected versions: <2.5.48.

CVSS

Versión: 4.0
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Puntuación base: 7.6

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.20%
Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 8
Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

ExplotaciónT1210 Exploitation of Remote Serviceslateral movement75 %
Impacto principalT1078 Valid Accountsstealth · persistence · privilege escalation · initial access85 %
Impacto secundarioT1556 Modify Authentication Processdefense impairment · persistence · credential access70 %

AV:N con PR:L (sesión válida preexistente) permite explotación remota de lógica de autenticación defectuosa. La reutilización de tokens OTP consumidos evade el segundo factor y accede a cuentas de usuario.

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Privileged Account Management User Account Management Password Policies Multi-factor Authentication Application Developer Guidance Active Directory Configuration

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Misp — Misp^AI

CWE

CWE-287, CWE-362

Referencias

https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/f34aee2c7

JSON original (NVD)

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      "value": "MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.\n\nThe HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user's session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.\n\n- The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).\n\n- The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user's MISP account.\n\n- Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.\n\nAffected versions: <2.5.48."
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