CVE-2026-102713

Estado: Pendiente de análisisAlta (8.8)—

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than

four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not

against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one

missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.

The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:

```c

/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */

status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,

...

fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),

```

`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the

Leer descripción completaMostrar menos

end of the first packet:

```

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow

0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region

```

Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them

back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.

The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs

ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the

attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never

returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and

the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.

Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,

and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.

Detalles técnicos trazas, registros y código del informe original

                        server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);

              packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
              packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);

READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5

    #0 __interceptor_memcpy
    #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy  filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78

CVSS

Versión: 4.0
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Puntuación base: 8.8

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

Probabilidad de explotación en los próximos 30 días: 0.31%
Percentil entre todas las CVEs puntuadas: 22
Fecha de la puntuación: 6/10/2026

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

🎯 Técnicas ATT&CK

Cómo se explota esta vulnerabilidad y qué consigue el atacante, en el lenguaje de MITRE ATT&CK.

ExplotaciónT1190 Exploit Public-Facing Applicationinitial access85 %
Impacto principalT1499.004 Application or System Exploitationimpact90 %
Impacto secundarioT1005 Data from Local Systemcollection80 %

Servidor TFTP expuesto (AV:N) sin autenticación acepta datagramas sin límite superior, causando DoS por agotamiento de pool de paquetes y divulgación de memoria heap mediante canal de lectura TFTP.

Inferido por nuestro agente de análisis a partir de la descripción oficial, el vector CVSS y la CWE, y comprobado por un supervisor. Puede contener errores.

🛡️ Mitigaciones ATT&CK que cubren estas técnicas

Filter Network Traffic Vulnerability Scanning Privileged Account Management Network Segmentation Limit Access to Resource Over Network Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Tecnologías afectadas (2)

⚠ Inferidas por IA a partir de la descripción — NVD aún no ha analizado esta CVE; no son CPE verificados.

Filex — Filex^AI Netx — Netx^AI

CWE

CWE-125, CWE-770

Referencias

https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f

JSON original (NVD)

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{
  "id": "CVE-2026-102713",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-102713",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "emo@eclipse.org",
        "cvssData": {
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "version": "4.0",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
          "product": "NetX Duo",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1.202602"
            }
          ],
          "packageName": "NetX Duo",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-29T18:17:10.457",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f",
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "emo@eclipse.org",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-125"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,\n\n                        server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n              packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n              packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n    #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n    #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy  filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-09-29T19:17:20.290",
  "sourceIdentifier": "emo@eclipse.org"
}