CVE-2024-31463

{
  "id": "CVE-2024-31463",
  "cveTags": [],
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-31463",
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "version": "2.0.3",
          "timestamp": "2024-07-03T15:16:37.818205Z"
        }
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "type": "Secondary",
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "cvssData": {
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "version": "3.1",
          "baseScore": 4.7,
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"
        },
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "exploitabilityScore": 1
      }
    ]
  },
  "affected": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "vendor": "metal3-io",
          "product": "ironic-image",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "< 24.1.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "published": "2024-04-17T16:15:08.637",
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"
    }
  ],
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "type": "Secondary",
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-288"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. "
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Ironic-image es una implementación de OpenStack Ironic empaquetada y configurada por Metal3. Cuando el modo de proxy inverso está habilitado mediante la variable `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecida en `true`, 1) las credenciales básicas HTTP se validan en el lado HTTPD en un contenedor separado, no en el servicio Ironic en sí y 2) Ironic escucha en la red host en un puerto privado 6388 en localhost de forma predeterminada. Como resultado, cuando se utiliza el modo de proxy inverso, cualquier usuario Pod o Unix local en el plano de control Node puede acceder a la API Ironic en el puerto privado sin autenticación. Un problema similar afecta a Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecido en `true`), aunque el potencial de ataque es menor allí. Este problema afecta a los operadores que implementan ironic-image en el modo de proxy inverso, que es el modo recomendado cuando se usa TLS (también recomendado), con la variable `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` desarmada o configurada en un valor numérico. En este caso, un atacante con privilegios suficientes para iniciar un pod en el plano de control con red de host puede acceder a la API Ironic y usarla para modificar la máquina básica, por ejemplo, aprovisionarla con una nueva imagen o cambiar la configuración del BIOS. Esta vulnerabilidad se soluciona en 24.1.1."
    }
  ],
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:28:28.497",
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"
}