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CVE-2018-11518

Estado: ModificadaAlta (8.1)—

A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller).

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In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece).

CVSS

Probabilidad de explotación (EPSS)

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System, de FIRST) estima la probabilidad de que una vulnerabilidad sea explotada en 30 días. Complementa a CVSS (impacto) y a CISA KEV (explotación confirmada).

Tecnologías afectadas (1)

Hcltech — Legacy IVR Firmware

CWE

Referencias

JSON original (NVD)

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      "value": "A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece)."
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  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T01:36:05.960",
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